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SHORTCOMINGS AND SOLUTIONS: REFORMING
THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS
FRAMEWORK IN THE WAKE OF THE DEEPWATER
HORIZON DISASTER
Andrew Hartsig*

I. INTRODUCTION
On April 20, 2010, an explosion rocked the BP Deepwater Horizon
offshore drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico.1 The explosion and resulting
fire killed eleven crew members, seriously injured sixteen others, and
eventually sank the rig.2 The explosion also marked the beginning of the
“world’s largest accidental release of oil into marine waters.”3 By the
time BP effectively stopped the flow of oil on July 15, its Macondo well
had discharged approximately 4.9 million barrels of oil.4 The Deepwater
Horizon disaster was a human and environmental tragedy, and it may
take years to assess the full scope of the damage to the people,
economies, and ecosystems of the Gulf region.
The Deepwater Horizon disaster revealed systemic weaknesses in
the administration of oil and gas activities on the Outer Continental Shelf
* Arctic Program Director for Ocean Conservancy, a national marine conservation
organization.
1. BOB GRAHAM & WILLIAM K. REILLY, Foreword to NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF
OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING, at vi (2011).
2. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE
DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE
DRILLING 55 (2011) [hereinafter NATIONAL COMMISSION].
3. Campbell Robertson & Clifford Krauss, Gulf Spill Is the Largest of Its Kind,
Scientists
Say,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Aug.
3,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/us/03spill.html.
4. Id.; see also JANE LUBCHENCO ET AL., BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL BUDGET:
WHAT
HAPPENED
TO
THE
OIL?
available
at
http://www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/imported_pdfs/posted/2931/Oil_Budget_
description_8_3_FINAL.844091.pdf.
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(OCS).5 It also underscored the difficulty of stopping and responding to
a major oil spill, even in the relatively accessible and temperate waters of
the Gulf of Mexico.
The National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
and Offshore Drilling (National Commission)—a bipartisan commission
created by the President and charged with investigating the disaster and
developing options for improving offshore oil and gas practices6—
identified a series of “weaknesses and . . . inadequacies” in the federal
government’s oversight of OCS oil and gas activities.7 The National
Commission found that these shortcomings affected the full spectrum of
OCS activities, from planning for OCS oil and gas lease sales, to
administering offshore exploration and development activities, to
planning and implementing oil spill response efforts.8 The National
Commission recommended a broad “overhaul” of “the regulatory
policies and institutions used to oversee offshore activities to address
these problems.”9
This Article discusses the existing framework for federal oversight of
OCS oil and gas activities—including oil spill preparation and response,
and compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act10 (NEPA)—
and recommends policy and legislative solutions to address the flaws in
that framework. Section II provides an overview of the existing
statutory, regulatory, and policy structures that govern oil and gas
activities, oil spill preparedness, and response on the OCS. Section III
reviews some of the initial investigations and administrative and
legislative actions that occurred in response to the Deepwater Horizon
disaster. Section IV identifies and discusses some of the critical
shortcomings that remain, and suggests reforms necessary to make OCS
oil and gas operations safer and more environmentally responsible.
Finally, Section V examines what may be the next frontier—expanded
oil and gas operations in OCS waters off Alaska’s North Slope—and
5. The Outer Continental Shelf is defined as “all submerged lands lying seaward and
outside of the area of lands beneath navigable waters as defined in [43 U.S.C. § 1301] . . .
and of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States and are subject to its
jurisdiction and control.” 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (2006).
6. Exec. Order No. 13543, 75 Fed. Reg. 29,397. 29, 397 (May 26, 2010).
7. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at ix.
8. See generally id. at 249-91 (identifying problems and recommending options for
improving government administration and oversight of OCS oil and gas and spill
response activities).
9. Id. at 250.
10. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (as
amended by Pub. L. 111-8, 123 Stat. 729 (March 11, 2009)).
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recommends additional measures necessary to protect vulnerable Arctic
ecosystems.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING OCS OIL AND
GAS ACTIVITIES AND OIL SPILL RESPONSE
Oil and gas activities on the OCS are controlled by a patchwork of
statutes, regulations, and policies. The OCS Lands Act11 (OCSLA) is
the principal statute governing offshore oil and gas activity in federal
waters. It establishes a multiple-stage framework that provides for oil
and gas planning, leasing, exploration, and development and production
on the OCS. The Oil Pollution Act of 199012 (OPA 90)—including
certain amendments to the Clean Water Act13—sets forth additional
requirements that govern planning and response related to oil spills in
marine waters. And as federal agencies plan for and decide whether to
approve OCS oil and gas activities, they often trigger the requirements of
NEPA. In addition to OCSLA, OPA 90, and NEPA, OCS oil and gas
activities may implicate a variety of other federal laws, including but not
limited to the Clean Air Act14, the Marine Mammal Protection Act15
(MMPA), the Coastal Zone Management Act16 (CZMA), the Endangered
Species Act17 (ESA), and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation
and Management Act18 (MSA). This Section discusses the OCSLA
framework for OCS development, specific portions of OPA 90 and the
Clean Water Act that pertain to oil spill preparedness and response, and
key provisions of NEPA as they relate to federal decision-making about
offshore oil and gas activities. It also notes briefly the ways in which
OCS oil and gas activities may trigger the requirements of other federal
environmental laws.

11. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356a (2006).
12. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2762 (2006).
13. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
14. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006).
15. Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1423h (2006).
16. Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2006).
17. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
18. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§
1801-1891d (2006).
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A. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
OCSLA was enacted in 195319 and amended significantly in 1978.20
Among other things, OCSLA established a national policy with respect
to the OCS.21 Congress declared that the OCS “should be made available
for expeditious and orderly development, subject to environmental
safeguards, in a manner which is consistent with the maintenance of
competition and other national needs.”22 To that end, Congress gave the
Secretary of the Interior the authority to lease areas of the OCS to private
industry for oil and gas exploration and development.23
1. Administration of OCSLA within the Department of the Interior
Since 1982, the Secretary of the Interior has delegated much of his or
her authority under OCSLA to the Minerals Management Service
(MMS), an agency within the Department of the Interior (DOI).24 MMS
promulgated binding regulations that provide additional detail regarding
the implementation of OCSLA.25 MMS, however, was not an effective
agency. Even before the Deepwater Horizon blowout, an Office of
Inspector General investigation of one MMS program “revealed an
organizational culture lacking acceptance of government ethical
standards, inappropriate personal behaviors, and a program without the
necessary internal controls in place to prevent future unethical or
unlawful behavior.”26 As the National Commission observed, “[p]erhaps
because of the cumulative lack of adequate resources, absence of a
sustained agency mission, or sheer erosion of professional culture within
some offices, MMS came progressively to suffer from serious
19. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (codified
as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356a (2006)).
20. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629
(1978) Congress has enacted more limited amendments to OCSLA several times since
1978. See, e.g., Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82
(1986).
21. 43 U.S.C. § 1332.
22. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(3).
23. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (directing the Secretary of the Interior to administer
the provisions of OCSLA relating to the leasing of the Outer Continental Shelf).
24. See NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 56 (describing the creation of MMS
by then-Secretary of the Interior James Watt in 1982).
25. See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. pts. 250, 251, 260 (2010).
26. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., INVESTIGATIVE REPORT:
MMS OIL MARKETING GROUP–LAKEWOOD 1 (2008), available at http://www.doioig.gov/
images/stories/reports/pdf//RIKinvestigation.pdf.
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deficiencies of organization and management.”27 These deficiencies
were laid bare in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon disaster.
As described in more detail in Section III(B) below, Secretary of the
Interior Ken Salazar made sweeping changes to DOI in the wake of the
disaster. As a result of these changes, MMS was abolished and replaced
by a transitional agency called the Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE).28
When
Secretary Salazar’s reorganization program is complete in October 2011,
MMS’s responsibilities will be divided among three separate
administrative entities operating within DOI: the Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management (BOEM), the Bureau of Safety and Environmental
Enforcement (BSEE), and the Office of Natural Resources Revenue
(ONRR).29 For consistency and to avoid confusion, this Article will in
most instances refer to the agency tasked with managing DOI’s OCS oil
and gas responsibilities as “BOEM.”
Regardless of its name, the agency that regulates OCS oil and gas
operations must implement the provisions of OCSLA. OCSLA
establishes a four-stage process for OCS leasing and development: (1)
development of a five-year OCS oil and gas leasing program, (2) OCS
lease sales, (3) exploration, and (4) development and production. The
paragraphs below describe these stages in more detail.
2. Five-year OCS leasing program
At the first stage of the OCSLA process, the Secretary of the Interior
must prepare a five-year oil and gas leasing program. “The leasing
program shall consist of a schedule of proposed lease sales indicating, as
precisely as possible, the size, timing, and location of leasing activity
which . . . will best meet national energy needs for the five-year period
following its approval or reapproval.”30 OCSLA instructs the Secretary
to “select the timing and location of leasing, to the maximum extent
practicable, so as to obtain a proper balance between the potential for
27. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 78.
28. SEC’Y OF THE INTERIOR, ORDER NO. 3,302: CHANGE OF THE NAME OF THE
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE TO THE BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT,
REGULATION, AND ENFORCEMENT (June 18, 2010).
29. SEC’Y OF THE INTERIOR, ORDER NO. 3,299: ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BUREAU OF
OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT, THE BUREAU OF SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT, AND THE OFFICE OF NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE (May 19, 2010); see
also Press Release, BOEM, Salazar, Bromwich Announce Next Steps in Overhaul of
Offshore Energy Oversight and Management (Jan. 19, 2011).
30. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006).
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environmental damage, the potential for the discovery of oil and gas, and
the potential for adverse impact on the coastal zone.”31
In crafting the leasing program, OCSLA requires the Secretary to
adhere to certain principles. For example, the Secretary must consider
“economic, social, and environmental values . . . and the potential impact
of oil and gas exploration on other resource values . . . and the marine,
coastal, and human environments.”32 When determining the timing and
location of lease sales, the Secretary must consider a variety of factors,
ranging from industry’s level of interest to the relative environmental
sensitivity and marine productivity of different areas of the OCS.33
The Secretary must “invite and consider suggestions” on the leasing
program from interested federal agencies and from the governor of states
that may be affected by the program.34 BOEM regulations require the
agency to invite and consider public comment from “all interested
parties, including the general public.”35 Before approving a leasing
program, the Secretary must submit the program, together with any
comments received, to the President and Congress.36
The Secretary must review an approved five-year program at least
once a year.37
The Secretary may revise or reapprove the leasing
program at any time; any significant revision, however, triggers the
procedural requirements that are prescribed for the promulgation of a
new leasing program.38 If an area of the OCS is not included in the
Secretary’s five-year leasing program, that area cannot be leased unless
the Secretary amends the program to include the missing area.39 If an
area of the OCS is included in the leasing program, that area may be
included in a future OCS lease sale, but the Secretary is not obligated to
lease the area.

31. Id. § 1344(a)(3).
32. Id. § 1344(a)(1).
33. Id. § 1344(a)(2).
34. Id. § 1344(c)(1).
35. 30 C.F.R. § 256.16(a) (2010); see also 30 C.F.R. § 256.17(b) (“Comments and
recommendations on any aspect of the proposed program may be submitted by a State or
local government or other persons to the Secretary within 90 days after the date of its
publication in the Federal Register.”).
36. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(d)(2).
37. Id. § 1344(e).
38. Id.
39. Id. § 1344(d)(3).
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3. OCS Lease Sales
At the second stage of the OCSLA process, the Secretary of the
Interior determines which OCS tracts to lease, and conducts a
competitive lease sale to auction OCS oil and gas leases to the highest
responsible bidder.40 To begin, the director of the leasing agency
recommends to the Secretary of the Interior areas identified for
environmental analysis and consideration for leasing.41 In doing so, the
director must consult with other federal agencies and consider
“environmental information, multiple-use conflicts, resource potential,
industry interest and other relevant information.”42 The director must
also consider comments from “[s]tates and local governments and
interested parties in response to calls for information and nominations.”43
It is not uncommon for OCS lease sales to encompass millions or tens of
millions of acres.44
After approving a notice of proposed lease sale, the Secretary of the
Interior must publish it in the Federal Register, send the notice to
governors of affected states, and respond to input from the affected
governors.45 At the auction, companies bid to purchase OCS leases
pursuant to bidding requirements established by OCSLA and its
implementing regulations.46 OCS leases may contain stipulations and
conditions developed to mitigate adverse environmental impacts.47 In

40. See 43 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1) (authorizing the Secretary to grant OCS leases).
41. 30 C.F.R. § 256.26(a) (2010).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., ALASKA OCS REGION, LEASE SALES
(2011),
available
at
http://alaska.boemre.gov/lease/hlease/
LeasingTables/lease_sales.pdf (showing that in recent lease sales in the Arctic OCS,
BOEM offered for lease nearly 30 million acres in lease sale 193 in the Chukchi Sea in
2008, about 8.7 million acres in lease sale 202 in the Beaufort Sea in 2007, and about 9.3
million acres in lease sale 195 in the Beaufort Sea in 2005); MINERALS MGMT. SERV.,
GULF OF MEXICO OCS REGION, GULF OF MEXICO OIL & GAS LEASE OFFERINGS (undated),
available at http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/homepg/lsesale/swiler/Table_2. PDF (showing
that since the early to mid-1980s, most OCS lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico region
have offered at least 20 million acres, and lease sale seventy-nine in 1984 offered more
than 50 million acres).
45. 43 U.S.C. § 1345(c) (2006); 30 C.F.R. §§ 256.29(c), 256.31(b) & (c).
46. See generally 43 U.S.C. § 1337; see also 30 C.F.R. §§ 256.32(b)–(e), 256.35–.47
(2010).
47. 30 C.F.R. § 256.29(a). In addition to environmental stipulations and conditions,
leases contain other limits. For example, the initial lease period is set between five and
ten years, 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(2); leases must provide for suspension or cancellation of
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general, however, a successful bidder gains the right “to explore, develop
and produce the oil and gas within the lease area, conditioned on due
diligence requirements and the approval of . . . [a] development and
production plan.”48
4. Exploration
At the third stage, lease operators may apply to explore their leases,
usually by drilling one or more exploratory wells.49 Before conducting
exploration drilling, an operator must submit an exploration plan for the
Secretary of the Interior’s approval.50
An exploration plan may encompass multiple leases in one OCS
region.51 It must include information about the proposed exploratory
activities, including an anticipated schedule, a description of equipment,
and “the general location of each well.”52 A plan must also demonstrate
that exploration activities will conform to relevant laws and regulations,
will be safe, will protect the rights of the lessor, will not unreasonably
interfere with other OCS uses, and will not cause undue damage to the
environment.53 BOEM regulations spell out in some detail the required
contents of OCS exploration plans.54
Once an operator submits an exploration plan to BOEM, the agency
has up to fifteen days to determine whether the plan is “deemed

the lease, id. § 1337(b)(5), (6); and leases may also be cancelled at any time if obtained
by fraud or misrepresentation. Id. § 1337(o).
48. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(4).
49. Instead of or in addition to drilling exploration wells, operators may seek to gain
information about OCS areas through the use of seismic testing or other activities.
BOEM considers these activities in a process separate from the exploration plan process.
See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. pt. 251 (setting forth regulations governing geological and
geophysical exploration on the OCS, including seismic marine surveys).
50. Id. § 1340(b), (c); see also 30 C.F.R. § 250.201(a).
51. 43 U.S.C. §1340 (c)(1).
52. Id. § 1340(c)(3)(A)–(D).
53. 30 C.F.R. § 250.202(a)–(e).
54. See, e.g., id. §§ 250.211–250.228 (providing additional information on what
exploration plans must include with respect to, inter alia, geological and geophysical
information (§ 250.214); biological, physical, and socioeconomic information (§
250.216); solid and liquid waste information (§ 250.217); air emissions (§ 250.218); oil
and hazardous substance spills information (§ 250.219); environmental monitoring
information (§ 250.221); lease stipulations (§ 250.222); mitigation measures (§ 250.223);
support aircraft and vessels (§ 250.224); onshore facilities (§ 250.225); Coastal Zone
Management Act information (§ 250.226); and environmental impact analysis (§
250.227).
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submitted.”55 BOEM will not deem an exploration plan submitted until
the plan’s proponent has corrected all problems or deficiencies in the
plan.56
After BOEM deems an exploration plan submitted, the agency must
send the plan, along with supporting information, to representatives from
affected states,57 review and evaluate the impacts of the exploration
activities,58 and prepare environmental documentation pursuant to
NEPA.59 BOEM may require a plan proponent to change its exploration
plan during the review process.60 From the time BOEM deems an
exploration plan submitted, the agency has just thirty days to approve,
require modification of, or disapprove the exploration plan.61
BOEM must approve an exploration plan if it finds that the plan is
consistent with the provisions of OCSLA, the provisions of regulations
implementing OCSLA, and the provisions of the underlying lease(s).62
The agency may not approve an exploration plan if proposed activities
“would probably cause serious harm or damage to life (including fish
and other aquatic life), to property, to any mineral (in areas leased or not
leased), to the national security or defense, or to the marine, coastal, or
human environment” and the activities cannot be modified to avoid that
harm or damage.63 If BOEM disapproves a plan, it may cancel the
underlying lease and the lessee is entitled to compensation.64
Beyond approval of an exploration plan, OCS operators may have to
obtain other approvals from BOEM before they begin exploratory
drilling.65 Operators also may need to obtain permits from other federal
agencies. For example, operators may need a discharge permit under the
Clean Water Act,66 or an emissions permit under the Clean Air Act,67

55. Id. § 250.231(a).
56. Id. § 250.231(b).
57. Id. § 250.232(a)(1)(2).
58. 30 C.F.R. § 250.232(b).
59. Id. § 250.232(c).
60. Id. § 250.232(d).
61. 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(1) (2006); see also 30 C.F.R. § 250.233.
62. 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(1).
63. Id. §§ 1334(a)(2)(A)(i), 1340(c)(1)(A) & (B).
64. Id. § 1340(c)(1)(B).
65. See, e.g., 30 C.F.R. § 250.281 (listing required approvals for applications for
permits to drill, for production safety systems, for new platforms and other structures (or
major modifications to platforms and other structures), and for applications to install
lease term pipelines).
66. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006) (establishing a permit system for the discharge
of pollutants into navigable waters).
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from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); or they may need a
permit for the “incidental take” of marine mammals under the MMPA68
from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
5. Development and production
If exploratory drilling reveals economically recoverable oil, an OCS
operator may initiate development and production activities. In OCS
areas outside the Western Gulf of Mexico, operators must submit a
development and production plan before they begin development
operations.69 In OCS areas within the Western Gulf of Mexico, operators
must submit a “development operations coordination document” before
they conduct development and production activities.70 Operators who
plan to use non-conventional production or completion technology must
submit a “deepwater operations plan” and “conceptual plan” before they
conduct post-drilling installation activities.71 Finally, before beginning
production from development projects located in more than 400 meters
of water, operators must submit a “conservation information
document.”72
BOEM regulations specify the conditions under which operators
must submit each type of plan, as well as the required contents of each
plan.73 For example, a development and production plan, or development
operations coordination document, must include information similar to
that which is required for an exploration plan, but must provide
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 7627 (2006) (providing for requirements to control air pollution
from certain OCS sources).
68. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(5)(D)(i) (2006) (providing for the issuance of permits to
allow the incidental take, by harassment, of small numbers of marine mammals).
69. 30 C.F.R. § 250.201(a) (requiring an operator to submit a development and
production plan before conducting any development and production activities on a lease
or unit in any OCS area other than the Western Gulf of Mexico); see also 43 U.S.C. §
1351(a)(1) (2006) (requiring lessees to submit development and production plans for
leases located in OCS areas outside the Gulf of Mexico); id. § 1351(l) (allowing the
Secretary of the Interior to require submission of development and production plans for
OCS areas in the Gulf of Mexico that are adjacent to Florida).
70. 30 C.F.R. § 250.201(a).
71. Id.; see also id. § 250.286(b) (noting that the Deepwater Operations Plan process
consists of both a Deepwater Operations Plan and a Conceptual Plan).
72. Id. § 250.201(a).
73. See id. §§ 250.241–250.285 (providing regulatory process relating to development
and production plans and development operations coordination documents); id. §§
250.286–250.295 (providing regulatory process relating to deepwater operations plans);
id. §§ 250.296–250.299 (providing regulatory process relating to conservation
information documents).
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additional information to address the increased scale of operations.74 A
deepwater operations plan must provide a variety of information,
including: a description and schematic of a typical wellbore, casing, and
completion; details on mooring, stationkeeping, drilling, completion, and
riser systems; and pipeline information.75 A conceptual plan must
provide information such as an overview of the development concept and
the distance of each proposed well to the production platform.76 A
conservation information document must discuss the development of a
reservoir; contain well log data and reservoir parameters; include
structure maps; and provide other information.77
Assuming a development and production plan or development
operations coordination document satisfies all regulatory requirements,
BOEM must deem the plan or document submitted within twenty-five
working days of submission to the agency.78 Once a plan or document is
“deemed submitted,” BOEM must take certain actions, including sending
the plan or document to certain public officials and agencies, making the
plan or document available to the general public, and initiating an
internal review process.79 BOEM must also evaluate the environmental
impacts of the activities described in the plan or document by preparing
documentation pursuant to NEPA.80
BOEM must make a decision on a “deemed submitted” development
and production plan, or development operations coordination document,
within sixty calendar days after either the close of required comment
periods, the day the final environmental impact statement—if any—is
released or adopted, or the date of the last amendment of a development
operations coordination document.81 BOEM may require modification if
the plan or document fails to meet all requirements, and it may
disapprove the plan if specific conditions apply.82 BOEM must approve
a development and production plan or development operations
coordination document if it complies with all applicable requirements.83
As with exploration drilling activities, operators may also be required to

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. §§ 250.241–250.262.
Id. § 250.292 (2010).
Id. § 250.289.
Id. § 250.297.
Id. § 250.266(a).
Id. § 250.267.
Id. § 250.269.
Id. § 250.270(a)(1) (2010).
Id. §§ 250.270(b), 250.271.
Id. § 250.270(b)(1).
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secure additional permits from BOEM and/or other agencies before they
commence development and production drilling activities.
B. Spill Planning, Response, and Liability Under OPA 90 and the Clean
Water Act
OPA 90—including its amendments to the Clean Water Act—is the
primary statute governing issues of planning, prevention, response, and
liability for oil spills in marine waters.84 Congress enacted OPA 90 in
the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill.85 The statute expanded the
federal government’s ability to prepare for and respond to oil spills on or
affecting U.S. waterways and coastlines by establishing new
requirements and by amending extensively the federal Clean Water Act.
Among other things, OPA 90 attempted to strengthen and clarify the
federal government’s role in oil spill planning, preparedness, and
response. It also expanded existing liability provisions within the Clean
Water Act.
1. Framework for Oil Spill Planning and Response
OPA 90’s amendments to the Clean Water Act established a multitier framework for planning for, and responding to, oil spills. At the
broadest tier, a National Contingency Plan “provide[s] for efficient,
coordinated, and effective action to minimize damage from oil and
hazardous substance discharges, including containment, dispersal, and
removal of oil and hazardous substances.”86 The National Contingency
Plan is prepared by a multi-agency team led by EPA,87 and must establish
procedures and standards for responding to worst-case oil spill
scenarios.88

84. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 83 (“[T]he Oil Pollution Act of
1990, supplemented by a Presidential Executive Order, imposes a panoply of oil-spill
planning, preparedness, and response requirements on fixed and floating facilities
engaged in oil and gas exploration, development, and production on the outer continental
shelf.” (citations omitted)).
85. See JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33705, OIL SPILLS IN
U.S. COASTAL WATERS: BACKGROUND, GOVERNANCE, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 9
(2009) (noting that Congress enacted OPA 90 in response to shortcomings in the
response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill).
86. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(1), (2) (2006).
87. 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.2, 300.110, 300.175 (2010).
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2)(J) (2006).
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Below the national level, regional response teams are responsible for
planning and coordinating preparedness and response at the regional
level.89 Regional response teams include representatives from federal
agencies as well as state and local government representatives.90 These
teams facilitate the “development and coordination of preparedness
activities before a response action is taken,” and help coordinate
“assistance and advice” during response actions.91 They also develop
Regional Contingency Plans, which are designed “to coordinate timely,
effective response by various federal agencies and other organizations.”92
Regional response teams help to provide oversight and consistency for
area- and facility-specific response plans within the region.93
Area committees, comprised of federal, state, and local agencies,
operate below the regional level.94 Area Committees are tasked with
preparing Area Contingency Plans.95 These plans must, among other
things, “be adequate to remove a worst case discharge, and to mitigate or
prevent a substantial threat of such a discharge, from a vessel, offshore
facility, or onshore facility operating in or near the area.”96 They must
also describe areas of special economic or environmental importance, list
equipment available to respond to a spill, compile a list of local spill
response experts, and describe how the Area Contingency Plan is
integrated with other spill response plans.97
Finally, at the narrowest tier are facility-specific spill response
plans.98 Unlike the response plans discussed above, facility response
plans are prepared by the owners or operators of those facilities, such as
oil and gas companies.99 In general, vessels and facilities cannot handle,
store, or transport oil if they do not have a plan approved by (or
submitted to) the appropriate agency.100 Facility response plans must
89. 40 C.F.R. § 300.115(a) (2010).
90. Id.
91. Id. § 300.115(a)(1).
92. Id. § 300.210(b).
93. Id. § 300.115(a)(2).
94. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(4)(A), (B) (2006); see also 40 C.F.R. § 300.5 (2010)
(defining “Area Committee”).
95. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(4)(B)(i).
96. Id. § 1321(j)(4)(C)(i); see also 40 C.F.R. § 300.210(c) (2010).
97. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(4)(C) (2006); see also 40 C.F.R. § 300.210(c) (2010).
98. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5) (2006); see also 40 C.F.R. § 300.211 (2010).
99. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i) (2006); see also 30 C.F.R. § 254.1(a) (2010) (“If
you are the owner or operator of an oil handling, storage, or transportation facility, and it
is located seaward of the coast line, you must submit a spill-response plan to MMS for
approval.”).
100. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(F) (2006).
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include “a plan for responding, to the maximum extent practicable, to a
worst case discharge, and to a substantial threat of such a discharge, of
oil or a hazardous substance.”101 In addition, among other requirements,
facility response plans must be consistent with the national and area
contingency plans for the given region, must specify the private
personnel and equipment that will be available to respond to a worst-case
spill, and must “describe the training, equipment testing, periodic
unannounced drills, and response actions” that will be carried pursuant to
the plan.102 BOEM has promulgated regulations that govern facility
response plans for offshore facilities, such as drilling rigs and
platforms.103
2. Agency Jurisdiction
Under the OPA 90 framework, the party or parties that cause an oil
spill—called “responsible parties”104—are primarily responsible for
cleaning up the spill.105 However, federal agencies also play key roles.
The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan
and Executive Orders and memoranda of understanding establish the
jurisdictions of the agencies.106 For example, the U.S. Coast Guard has
primary oil spill response authority offshore; it is responsible for
coordinating the efforts of federal, state, and private parties and
overseeing spill cleanup efforts.107 NOAA’s Office of Response and

101. Id. § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i).
102. Id. § 1321(j)(5)(D)(iv).
103. See 30 C.F.R. pt. 254 (2010); see also 40 C.F.R. § 300.211(b) (2010) (noting
BOEM regulations apply to offshore facilities).
104. 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32) (2006) (defining “responsible party”).
105. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. E, § 2.3(b) (“Cleanup responsibility for an oil
discharge immediately falls on the responsible party.”).
106. See Exec. Order No. 12,777, 56 Fed. Reg. 54,757 (Oct. 18, 1991); see also
Memorandum of Understanding Among the Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of
Transportation, and Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, App. B, 40
C.F.R. Part 112, app. B.
107. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.175(b)(1) (2010) (noting that the Coast Guard provides
coordination of cleanup activities in coastal areas); 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. E § 3.3.1
(providing that the Coast Guard will provide On-Scene Coordinators “for oil discharges,
including discharges from facilities and vessels under the jurisdiction of another federal
agency, within or threatening the coastal zone”). The Environmental Protection Agency
has primary response authority for inland spills. Id.

2011]

Shortcomings and Solutions

283

Restoration provides scientific analysis and consultation during spillresponse activities.108
Under existing law, the federal agencies responsible for responding
to an oil spill are not necessarily the agencies responsible for overseeing
planning and preparation for an oil spill. For example, even though the
Coast Guard is responsible for overseeing oil spill response efforts in
offshore areas, BOEM regulates oil spill planning and preparedness for
offshore oil and gas facilities and offshore production pipelines.109
3. Oil Spill Liability
OPA 90 consolidated and broadened existing liability provisions to
establish a new liability structure for oil spills.110 Under that structure,
responsible parties are liable for removal costs and damages associated
with the discharge or threat of discharge of oil into navigable waters,
shorelines, or the Exclusive Economic Zone.111 A responsible party is
liable for all cleanup costs incurred by both government agencies and
private parties.112 Under OPA 90, responsible parties are also liable for a
broad range of damages including injury to natural resources, loss of real
or personal property, loss of subsistence use of natural resources, lost
revenues resulting from destruction of property or natural resource
injury, lost profits resulting from property loss or natural resource injury,
and costs of providing extra public services during or after spill
response.113
OPA 90’s liability scheme established caps for cleanup costs and
other damages (except in limited situations such as gross negligence or
willful misconduct).114 For example, liability for offshore facilities is
capped at $75 million; liability for onshore facilities and deepwater ports

108. 40 C.F.R. § 300.175(b)(7); see also 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, app. E, § 6.4.1. “The
Office provides comprehensive solutions to environmental hazards caused by oil,
chemicals, and marine debris.” Office of Response and Restoration, NOAA NAT’L
OCEAN SERVICE, http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/#2 (last visited March 28, 2011).
109. See 30 C.F.R. pt. 254 (2010) (regulating oil spill response planning requirements
for offshore facilities).
110. See, e.g., RAMSEUR, supra note 85, at 11.
111. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006).
112. Id. § 2702(b)(1).
113. Id. § 2702(b)(2).
114. Id. § 2704.
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is limited to $350 million.115 Defenses to liability may include acts of
God, acts of war, and acts or omissions of a third party.116
After the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Congress imposed a five-cent-perbarrel tax on the oil industry to support the already-existing Oil Spill
Liability Trust Fund, but the five-cent rate ended on December 31,
1994.117 In April 2006, the tax resumed as required by the Energy Policy
Act of 2005.118 The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
increased the tax rate to eight cents per barrel through 2016 and nine
cents per barrel in 2017.119 Monies from the Oil Spill Liability Trust
Fund may be used to pay for a limited number of expenses including, but
not limited to, costs associated with uncompensated removal and damage
costs, response to and removal of oil spills, assessment of damage to
natural resources and development and implementation of plans to
restore or replace those resources, and loss of government revenue.120
However, payout from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund cannot exceed
$1 billion for “any single incident,” and natural resource damage
assessments and claims relating to any single incident cannot exceed
$500 million.121
C. The National Environmental Policy Act
NEPA is the “basic national charter for protection of the
environment.”122 It is designed to ensure that federal decision-makers
“will have available, and will carefully consider, detailed information
concerning significant environmental impacts” and that “relevant
information will be made available” to the public.123 While it is often
described as a procedural statute, “NEPA plays a unique role in injecting
consideration of environmental effects in what otherwise would be single
115. Id. § 2704(a)(3), (4).
116. Id. § 2703(a).
117. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7505(a),
(b), 103 Stat. 2106, 2363, (1989) (amending 26 U.S.C. § 4611 to provide that the fivecent-per-barrel tax was in effect after Jan. 1, 1990 and before Jan. 1, 1995).
118. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L No. 109-58, § 1361, 119 Stat. 594, 1058–59
(2005) (reinstating tax to fund the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund beginning April 1, 2006).
119. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §
405(a)(1), (b), 122 Stat. 3765, 3860–61 (2008) (increasing tax rates and providing that
the tax will not apply after Dec. 31, 2017).
120. 33 U.S.C. § 2712(a) (2006).
121. 26 U.S.C. § 9509(c)(2)(A) (2006).
122. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (2010).
123. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768 (2004) (quoting Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989)).
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resource-driven decisions.”124 Federal agency actions—such as issuance
of OCS oil and gas leasing programs, issuance of OCS leases, and
decisions to approve site-specific OCS oil and gas activities—often
trigger NEPA’s environmental analysis requirements.
Broadly speaking, NEPA provides for three levels of environmental
analysis.125 First, if a proposed agency action is a “major federal action
[ ] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,” NEPA
requires federal agencies to prepare a detailed statement on the
environmental impacts of the proposed action.126
This detailed
statement, called an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS),127 should
“provide full and fair discussion of significant environmental impacts
and . . . inform decisionmakers and the public of the reasonable
alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance
the quality of the human environment.”128 When evaluating “reasonably
foreseeable” environmental impacts, an EIS must consider “impacts
which have catastrophic consequences, even if their probability of
occurrence is low.”129 While agencies generally prepare EISs for specific
actions, such as a particular oil and gas lease sale, they may also prepare
“programmatic” EISs to evaluate the potential impacts of broader agency
actions, including the development of new regulations or programs.130
To avoid duplication and to facilitate greater focus “on the issues specific
to the subsequent action,” NEPA regulations encourage federal agencies
to “tier” EISs such that EISs for later, narrower actions incorporate prior,
broader-scale EISs by reference.131 While an EIS does not require the
agency to adopt any particular alternative, it should inform the agency
decisionmaking process.132 The EIS process leads to a “Record of
124. Janis Searles, National Environmental Policy Act, in OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW
POLICY 181, 181-82 (Donald C. Baur, Tim Eichenberg & Michael Sutton, eds.,
2008) (discussing programmatic EISs).
125. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, REPORT REGARDING THE MINERALS
MANAGEMENT SERVICE’S NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT POLICIES, PRACTICES,
AND PROCEDURES AS THEY RELATE TO OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS
EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT 8 (2010).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i) (2006).
127. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.11 (2010).
128. Id. § 1502.1.
129. Id. § 1502.22(b)(1).
130. See id. § 1500.4(i) (allowing the use of “program, policy, or plan environmental
impact statements”); see also Searles, supra note 124, at 187-88 (discussing
programmatic EISs).
131. Id. § 1502.20; see also id. § 1500.4(i) (discussing tiering from programmatic
EISs).
132. Id. § 1502.14.
AND
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Decision” in which the agency must state its final decision, identify the
alternatives it considered, discuss how it balanced various factors, state
whether the final decision avoided or minimized environmental harm,
and—where applicable—adopt a monitoring and enforcement program
to facilitate mitigation.133
Second, if an agency action is of a type that does not normally
require an EIS, an agency may choose to prepare a less rigorous analysis,
called an Environmental Assessment (EA), to determine whether it is
necessary to prepare an EIS.134 Agencies may also prepare EAs to “assist
agency planning and decisionmaking.”135 An EA is “a concise public
document” that must contain brief discussions of the need for,
alternatives to, and environmental impacts of, the proposed agency
action.136 If an EA reveals that a proposed action will have significant
impacts on the environment, the agency must prepare an EIS.137 If not,
the agency may produce a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI)
that explains briefly why the proposed action will not have significant
environmental impacts.138
Third, NEPA regulations allow federal agencies to identify specific
categories of actions—called “categorical exclusions”—that “do not
individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human
environment.”139 If an action is categorically excluded, an agency need
not prepare an EIS or EA for that action.140 When federal agencies
identify categorical exclusions, they must “provide for extraordinary
circumstances in which a normally excluded action may have a
significant environmental effect.”141
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has observed that
the scope of BOEM’s NEPA analyses for OCS oil and gas actions may
differ, depending on the stage of the OCSLA process that the agency is
analyzing.142 The court noted that BOEM “may issue a broader EIS at

133. Id. § 1505.2.
134. Id. §§ 1501.4, 1508.9.
135. Id. § 1501.3(b).
136. Id. § 1508.9.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.18 (2010) (defining
“major federal action”); 1508.27 (defining “significantly”); 1508.3; 1508.8 (defining
“affecting” and “effects”); 1508.14 (defining “human environment”).
138. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (2010).
139. Id. § 1508.4.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Dep’t of the Interior, 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir.
2009).
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the earlier ‘need and site selection’ stage of a program, and issue
subsequent, more detailed environmental impact statements at the
program’s later, more site-specific stage.”143 In practice, BOEM has
prepared broad, programmatic EISs when it issues a five-year oil and gas
leasing program or a lease sale that covers millions of acres of the
OCS.144 The agency has analyzed decisions about site-specific oil and
gas activities, such as approval of exploration plans, in EAs.145 In many
cases, BOEM has not prepared EISs or EAs for site-specific OCS
activities because it created and applied categorical exclusions for these
activities.146
D. Other Environmental Statutes
A number of other statutes in addition to OCSLA, OPA 90, and
NEPA may be implicated at various stages of the OCS oil and gas
process. For example, proposed OCS actions may trigger the need to
prepare a consistency determination pursuant to the CZMA.147 If an
agency’s OCS action may affect a species listed under the ESA, it will
likely require consultation with NOAA or the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service as to the impacts of the action.148 Similarly, proposed OCS
actions may require consultation with NOAA pursuant to the MSA.149
143. Id. at 474 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28).
144. See, e.g., MINERALS MGMT. SERV., 1 OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL & GAS
LEASING PROGRAM: 2007–2012 FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (2007)
[hereinafter 2007–2012 FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM FEIS] (analyzing nationwide leasing
program); MINERALS MGMT. SERV., 1 CHUKCHI SEA PLANNING AREA OIL AND GAS LEASE
SALE 193 AND SEISMIC SURVEYING ACTIVITIES IN THE CHUKCHI SEA, FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT I-2 (2007) [hereinafter LEASE SALE 193 FEIS]
(analyzing a lease sale covering about 34 million acres).
145. See generally, e.g., MINERALS MGMT. SERV., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT:
SHELL OFFSHORE INC. 2010 OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LEASE EXPLORATION PLAN FOR
CAMDEN BAY, ALASKA, BEAUFORT SEA LEASES (2009) [hereinafter 2009 BEAUFORT EA];
MINERALS MGMT. SERV., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: SHELL GULF OF MEXICO, INC.
2010 EXPLORATION DRILLING PROGRAM, BURGER, CRACKERJACK, AND SW SHOEBILL
PROSPECTS CHUKCHI SEA OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF (2009) [hereinafter 2009 CHUKCHI
EA].
146. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 125, at 25 (describing BOEM’s
application of categorical exclusions in the Gulf of Mexico).
147. See 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (2006) (providing for determinations to facilitate
consistency with State coastal management programs).
148. See id. § 1536(a)(2) (providing for interagency consultation with respect to
species listed under the ESA).
149. See id. § 1855(b)(2) (providing for interagency consultation with respect to
essential fish habitat).
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As noted above, drill rigs and associated emissions sources may trigger
the need for an emissions permit from EPA pursuant to the Clean Air
Act.150 Similarly, a drill rig’s discharges into marine waters may require
a Clean Water Act permit from EPA.151 OCS activities that could result
in the harassment of marine mammals may require an incidental
harassment authorization from NOAA.152 Other statutes may come into
play, as well. The statutes listed in this paragraph are not the focus of
this Article. Nonetheless, they may affect proposed OCS activities in
important ways.
III. INITIAL REACTIONS TO THE DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER:
INVESTIGATIONS AND REFORMS
Shortly after the April 20, 2010 blowout and explosion on the
Deepwater Horizon, it was obvious that the scale of the disaster was
unprecedented, that it would have significant impacts to the Gulf of
Mexico’s people, economies, and wildlife, and that those impacts would
be both immediate and long-lasting. Decision-makers in the executive
branch and in Congress acknowledged that governance of OCS oil and
gas activities needed to change. In the days and months that followed the
blowout, President Obama, Secretary of the Interior Salazar, and others
launched investigations—some broad, others narrow—to examine
various aspects of the disaster. At DOI, Secretary of the Interior Salazar
launched a program to restructure the Department’s oversight of the
industry and initiated other targeted reforms. Legislators in the 111th
Congress crafted, but did not pass, legislation designed to address
problems in the existing law. The following Section reviews some of
these efforts.
A. Investigations and Studies Related to the Deepwater Horizon
Disaster
As noted at the outset of this Article, on May 21, 2010, President
Obama created the “National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon
Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling.”153
He directed the National
150. See 42 U.S.C. § 7627 (2006) (providing for requirements to control air pollution
from certain OCS sources).
151. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006) (establishing a permit system for the discharge
of pollutants into navigable waters).
152. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(5)(D) (2006) (providing for the issuance of permits to
allow the incidental take, by harassment, of small numbers of marine mammals).
153. Exec. Order No. 13,543, 75 Fed. Reg. 29,397, 29,397 (May 26, 2010).
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Commission “to examine the relevant facts and circumstances
concerning the root causes of the Deepwater Horizon oil disaster; [and]
develop options for guarding against, and mitigating the impact of, oil
spills associated with offshore drilling, taking into consideration the
environmental, public health, and economic effects of such options . . .
.”154 The National Commission issued its report and recommendations
on January 11, 2011.155
Although the National Commission’s
recommendations may eventually spur administrative or legislative
change, the recommendations themselves have no immediate effect on
existing law, regulation, or policy.
At DOI, Secretary Salazar initiated an internal study of the
Department’s practices related to OCS oil and gas activities. On April
30, 2010, he created an OCS Safety Oversight Board.156 Among other
things, Secretary Salazar tasked the Oversight Board with “making
recommendations to improve and strengthen the Department’s overall
management, regulation, and oversight of OCS operations.”157 On
September 1, 2010, the Oversight Board issued a report that included a
suite of recommendations for reform.158 Three days later, the Director of
BOEM released an “implementation plan” that described how BOEM
would address—or was already addressing—the Oversight Board’s
recommendations.159
Interior Secretary Salazar initiated additional studies relating to the
Deepwater Horizon disaster as well. He asked DOI’s Office of Inspector
General to evaluate BOEM’s practices.160 The Office of Inspector
General cooperated with the Oversight Board and, building on the
154. Id.
155. See generally NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2.
156. SEC’Y OF INTERIOR, ORDER NO. 3,298: ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF SAFETY OVERSIGHT BOARD (Apr. 30, 2010).
157. Id.
158. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF SAFETY
OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT TO SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR KEN SALAZAR (Sept. 1, 2010),
available at http://www.noia.org/website/download.asp?id=40069.
159. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION, AND ENFORCEMENT,
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN IN RESPONSE TO THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF SAFETY
OVERSIGHT BOARD’S SEPTEMBER 1, 2010 REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
(Sept.
4,
2010),
available
at
http://www.interior.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=
security/getfile&PageID=43676. See also infra Part III.B.
160. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, CR-EV-MMS-00152010, A NEW HORIZON: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE OF THE BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY
MANAGEMENT, REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT 1 (Dec. 2010), available at
http://www.doioig.gov/images/stories/reports/pdf/A%20New%20Horizon%20Public.pdf.
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recommendations of the Oversight Board, issued its own final report in
December 2010.161 In addition to the Oversight Board and Office of
Inspector General investigations, Secretary Salazar commissioned a more
targeted study by the National Academy of Engineering—focused on
technical issues—to analyze the causes of the Deepwater Horizon
disaster to help identify “corrective steps” necessary “to address the
mechanical failures underlying the accident.”162 The National Academy
released an interim letter to Secretary Salazar on November 16, 2010.163
DOI also participated in at least two joint studies. First, on April 21,
2010 the U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard) and BOEM began a joint
investigation of the causes of the Deepwater Horizon disaster.164 The
investigators “have the power to issue subpoenas, hold public hearings,
call witnesses, and take other steps” to help them determine the cause of
the disaster.165 As of this writing, the joint investigation is ongoing.166
Second, on May 14, 2010, Secretary Salazar and Council on
Environmental Quality Chair Nancy Sutley announced a joint review that
focused on BOEM’s implementation of NEPA.167 Working with BOEM,
the Council on Environmental Quality issued a final report and
recommendations on August 16, 2010.168
In addition to the foregoing studies, the Coast Guard prepared an
“Incident Specific Preparedness Review” designed “to examine the
161. Id.
162. Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Salazar Launches Safety and Envtl. Prot.
Reforms to Toughen Oversight of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations para. 8 (May 11,
2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Launches-Safety-andEnvironmental-Protection-Reforms-to-Toughen-Oversight-of-Offshore-Oil-and-GasOperations.cfm?renderforprint=1&.
163. Letter from Donald C. Winter, Nat’l Acad. of Eng’g and Nat’l Research Council
of the Nat’l Acads., to Ken Salazar, Sec’y of the Interior (Nov. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.nationalacademies.org/includes/DH_Interim_Report_final.pdf.
164. Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Sec’y Napolitano and Sec’y Salazar
Launch Full Investigation of Deepwater Horizon Incident in the Gulf of Mex. (April 27,
2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1272395702575.shtm; see
also Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Salazar and Napolitano Launch Full
Investigation of Deepwater Horizon Incident in the Gulf of Mex. (April 27, 2010),
available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/SECRETARY-NAPOLITANOAND-SECRETARY-SALAZAR-LAUNCH-FULL-INVESTIGATION-OF-DEEPWATERHORIZON-INCIDENT-IN-THE-GULF-OF-MEXICO.cfm?renderforprint=1&.
165. Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Security, supra note 164, para. 5.
166. See
DEEPWATER
HORIZON
JOINT
INVESTIGATION,
http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/site/3043/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) (official
site).
167. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 125, at 1.
168. Id.
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implementation and effectiveness of the preparedness and response to the
BP Deepwater Horizon incident as it related to the National Contingency
Plan, Area Contingency Plans, and other oil spill response plans.”169
The Coast Guard distributed its final report in March of 2011.170 Finally,
the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (Chemical
Safety Board) launched an examination of the Deepwater Horizon
disaster that “include[s] an examination of key technical factors, the
safety cultures involved, and the effectiveness of relevant laws,
regulations, and industry standards.”171 As of this writing, the Chemical
Safety Board’s investigation is ongoing.
In addition to triggering a considerable number of studies and
investigations, the Deepwater Horizon disaster also gave rise to change,
both actual and attempted. The following sections focus on reforms
implemented by DOI and reforms considered—but not enacted—by
Congress.
B. Reforms at the Department of the Interior
Secretary Salazar began to implement reforms at DOI soon after the
Deepwater Horizon blowout and explosion. Perhaps the most visible of
these changes was the dissolution of MMS and the creation of three
separate administrative agencies within DOI to take its place. Secretary
Salazar also instituted a temporary moratorium on deepwater drilling,
tightened safety requirements for OCS operators, and restricted the use
of categorical exclusions for deepwater exploration drilling.

169. U.S. COAST GUARD, BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL INCIDENT SPECIFIC
PREPAREDNESS REVIEW 1 (2011), available at http://www.uscg.mil/foia/docs/
DWH/BPDWH.pdf.
170. See Memorandum from R.J. Papp, Jr., Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, on Final
Action Memorandum for the Incident Specific Preparedness Review of the Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill (March 18, 2011), available at http://www.uscg.mil/foia/
docs/DWH/BPDWH.pdf.
171. See Letter from John S. Bresland, Chairman, U.S. Chem. Safety and Hazard
Investigation Bd., to Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, U.S. House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce and Bart Stupak, Chairman, U.S. House Comm. on Energy and Commerce
and Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations (June 18, 2010), available at
http://www.csb.gov/assets/news/document/Response_to_Rep_Waxman_Stupak_-_BP_
Transocean_June_18_2010.pdf.
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1. Restructuring DOI’s Oversight of OCS Oil and Gas Activities
Less than one month after the blowout and explosion on the
Deepwater Horizon, Secretary Salazar announced his intent to abolish
the MMS and distribute its responsibilities among three separate
agencies within DOI.172 Secretary Salazar undertook the restructuring
project to resolve what he described as “conflicting missions” within
MMS.173 By creating three distinct agencies, the Secretary hoped to
“improve the management, oversight, and accountability of activities on
the Outer Continental Shelf; ensure a fair return to the taxpayer from
royalty and revenue collection and disbursement activities; and provide
independent safety and environmental oversight and enforcement of
offshore activities.”174
Implementation of the restructuring program took place in phases.
First, on June 18, 2010 Secretary Salazar changed the name of MMS to
BOEMRE.175
BOEMRE was a transitional agency tasked with
“exercis[ing] all authorities previously vested in the MMS.”176 Second,
on October 1, 2010 Secretary Salazar established the Office of Natural
Resources Revenue (ONRR).177 Among other things, ONRR assumed
responsibility for the management of revenue from offshore leases.178
Third, on January 19, 2011, Secretary Salazar announced that
BOEMRE’s remaining responsibilities would be divided between two
new Bureaus within DOI: BOEM would begin to carry out the
Department’s OCS resource development and energy management
functions, while BSEE would begin to oversee the Department’s OCS
safety and enforcement functions.179 More specifically, BOEM will

172. ORDER NO. 3,299, supra note 29.
173. Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Salazar Divides MMS’s Three Conflicting
Missions: Establishes Independent Agency to Police Offshore Energy Operations para. 2
(May 19, 2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-DividesMMSs-Three-Conflicting-Missions.cfm?renderforprint=1&.
174. ORDER NO. 3,299, supra note 29, at 1.
175. ORDER NO. 3,302, supra note 28.
176. Id. at 1.
177. SEC’Y OF THE INTERIOR, ORDER NO. 3,306: ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES UNDER THE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY—POLICY, MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET (Oct. 1, 2010), available at
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=
46124.
178. Id. at 1.
179. See Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Salazar, Bromwich Announce Next Steps
in Overhaul of Offshore Energy Oversight and Management paras. 7-8 (Jan. 19, 2011),
available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Bromwich-Announce-Next-
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carry out planning, leasing, environmental studies, NEPA analysis,
resource evaluation, and other related functions, while BSEE will
“enforce safety and environmental regulations.”180 DOI expects to
complete the implementation of its reorganization program by October 1,
2011.
2. Temporary Moratorium on Deepwater Drilling
In addition to instituting internal reorganizations within DOI,
Secretary Salazar temporarily halted certain on-water drilling activities in
the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster. On May 27, 2010,
Secretary Salazar ordered a six-month moratorium that prohibited new
OCS operators from drilling new deepwater wells and required
deepwater wells that were in the process of being drilled to halt
operations “at the first safe stopping point.”181
Some oil and gas service providers affected by the prohibition
challenged the moratorium in federal district court and requested that the
court issue a preliminary injunction to enjoin the moratorium.182 The
district court agreed with the plaintiffs and issued a preliminary
injunction on June 22, 2010.183 On July 12, 2010, in response to the
Steps-In-Overhaul-of-Offshore-Energy-Oversight-andManagement.cfm?renderforprint=1&.
180. Id.
181. Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Salazar Calls for New Safety Measures for
Offshore Oil and Gas Operations; Orders Six Month Moratorium on Deepwater Drilling:
Cancels Western Gulf and Virginia Lease Sales, Suspends Proposed Arctic Drilling para.
4 (May 27, 2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Calls-forNew-Safety-Measures-for-Offshore-Oil-and-Gas-Operations-Orders-Six-MonthMoratorium-on-Deepwater-Drilling.cfm?renderforprint=1& (last visited Feb. 18, 2011).
See also Memorandum from Ken Salazar, Sec’y of the Interior, to Dir. of Minerals
Mgmt. Serv. para. 2 (May 28, 2010) (finding that “offshore drilling of new deepwater
wells poses an unacceptable threat of serious and irreparable harm to wildlife and the
marine, coastal, and human environment” and “that the installation of additional safety or
environmental protection equipment is necessary to prevent injury or loss of life and
damage to property and the environment”), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/
pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=33715; Press Release,
Dep’t of the Interior, Interior Issues Directive to Guide Safe, Six-Month Moratorium on
Deepwater Drilling para. 3 (May 30, 2010) (specifying that, for purposes of the directive,
“deepwater” drilling in water depths greater than five hundred feet), available at
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Interior-Issues-Directive-to-Guide-Safe-SixMonth-Moratorium-on-Deepwater-Drilling.cfm?renderforprint=1&.
182. Hornbeck Offshore Servs., LLC v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627, 630–32 (E.D.
La. 2010).
183. Id. at 639.
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district court’s injunction, Secretary Salazar rescinded the original May
27 moratorium and issued a new, superseding moratorium scheduled to
“last until November 30, 2010 or until such earlier time that the
Secretary determines that deepwater drilling operations can proceed
safely.”184
In the months following July 12, 2010 BOEM implemented new
rules—described below in Section IV (B)(4)—designed to enhance the
safety of OCS drilling operations. On October 12, 2010, Secretary
Salazar announced that “the strengthened safety measures” that BOEM
had implemented, “along with improved spill response and blowout
containment capabilities, have reduced risks to a point where operators
who play by the rules and clear the higher bar can be allowed to resume”
deepwater drilling operations.185 Pursuant to the Secretary’s decision, the
CEOs of companies seeking to drill deepwater wells must certify that
their company is in compliance with all applicable rules, and operators
must demonstrate that they have oil spill containment devices readily
available for deployment.186
On February 28, 2011, BOEM announced that it “approved the first
deepwater drilling permit since the Deepwater Horizon explosion and
resulting oil spill,” noting that it approved the permit because “the
operator successfully demonstrated that it [could] drill its deepwater well
safely and that it [was] capable of containing a subsea blowout if it were

184. Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Sec’y Salazar Issues New Suspensions to
Guide Safe Pause on Deepwater Drilling: Bromwich to Engage Public, Industry and
Stakeholders in Deepwater Drilling Safety Reforms para. 7 (July 12, 2010), available at
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Secretary-Salazar-Issues-New-Suspensions-toGuide-Safe-Pause-on-Deepwater-Drilling.cfm?renderforprint=1&;
see
also
Memorandum from Ken Salazar, Sec’y of the Interior to Michael R. Bromwich, Dir. of
Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation and Enforcement (July 12, 2010), available
at
http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&Page
ID=38375. Secretary Salazar also appealed the district court’s injunction of the original
moratorium. Because Secretary Salazar rescinded and superseded the original May 27
moratorium, which was the subject of his appeal, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. Hornbeck Offshore Servs., LLC v. Salazar,
No. 10-30585, 2010 WL 3825385, at *1 (5th Cir. Sept. 29, 2010).
185. Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Salazar: Deepwater Drilling May Resume for
Operators Who Clear Higher Bar for Safety, Environmental Protection para. 3 (Oct. 12,
2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Deepwater-DrillingMay-Resume-for-Operators-Who-Clear-Higher-Bar-for-Safety-EnvironmentalProtection.cfm?renderforprint=1&.
186. Id. para. 9.
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to occur.”187 Since that time, the agency has continued to approve
deepwater drilling applications.188
3. Limits on the Use of Categorical Exclusions
DOI also took steps to limit the use of categorical exclusions under
NEPA when approving OCS oil and gas activities. On August 16,
2010—the same day that the Council on Environmental Quality released
its report on BOEM’s implementation of NEPA—Secretary Salazar
announced that DOI would “undertake[ ] a comprehensive review of its
[NEPA] process and the use of categorical exclusions for exploration and
drilling on the [OCS].” 189 In the interim, Secretary Salazar directed
BOEM to “restrict its use of categorical exclusions for offshore oil and
gas development to activities involving limited environmental risk . . .
.”190
Specifically, the Director of BOEM prohibited the agency from
using certain categorical exclusions to satisfy NEPA review requirements
for plans that require an application for a permit to drill and that involve
the use of a subsea blowout preventer or a surface blowout preventer on
a floating facility.191 Pursuant to the memorandum, BOEM will use an
EA to analyze these types of projects.192 The Director of BOEM directed
the agency to prepare categorical exclusion reviews (CER) for other
types of OCS plans.193 CERs assess whether the plan implicates any
187. Press Release, BOEMRE, BOEMRE Approves First Deepwater Drilling Permit to
Meet Important New Safety Standards in Gulf of Mexico paras. 1-2 (Feb. 28, 2011).
188. See, e.g., Press Release, BOEMRE, BOEMRE Approves Operations for Tenth
Deepwater Well: Drilling Permit Meets Critical New Safety Standards para. 1 (Apr. 8,
2011) (announcing approval of tenth deepwater well since the Deepwater Horizon
disaster).
189. Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Categorical Exclusions for Gulf Offshore
Activity to be Limited while Interior Reviews NEPA Process and Develops Revised
Policy
para.
1
(Aug.
16,
2010),
available
at
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Categorical-Exclusions-for-Gulf-OffshoreActivity-to-be-Limited-While-Interior-Reviews-NEPA-Process-and-Develops-RevisedPolicy.cfm?renderforprint=1&.
190. Id.
191. Memorandum from Michael R. Bromwich, Dir. of the Bureau of Ocean Energy
Mgmt., Regulation, and Enforcement, to Walter Cruickshank, Deputy Dir. of the Bureau
of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Regulation, and Enforcement, and Robert LaBelle, Acting
Assoc. Dir. for Offshore Energy and Minerals Mgmt., 1 (Aug. 16, 2010), available at
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=
42011.
192. Id. at 2.
193. Id.
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“extraordinary circumstances” that would require preparation of an
EA.194
As of this writing, DOI’s NEPA review is ongoing. When DOI
completes its review process, it intends to “announce a new approach to
NEPA compliance that takes into account the joint recommendations
included in CEQ’s [August 16, 2010] report, statutory and/or regulatory
constraints, and other appropriate factors.”195
4. Strengthened Safety Requirements for OCS Lessees
DOI also took steps to strengthen safety requirements that governed
OCS oil and gas operations. In June 2010, DOI issued a Notice to
Lessees (NTL)196 that required oil and gas lessees and operators who
apply for new drilling permits or seek approval of exploration or
development plans or development operations coordination documents
“to submit information that addresses the possibility of a blowout and
detail[ ] steps they are taking to prevent blowouts.”197 Among other
things, the NTL requires OCS operators to provide a well-specific
blowout and worst-case discharge scenario, as well as the assumptions
and calculations behind these scenarios.198
In September 2010, DOI announced two new safety rules: the
drilling safety rule and the workplace safety rule.199 The drilling safety
rule requires operators who apply for permits for drilling projects to meet
194. Id.
195. Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 189, at 2.
196. NAT’L NOTICE TO LESSEES AND OPERATORS OF FED. OIL AND GAS LEASES, OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF (OCS), DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, MINERALS MGMT. SERV., NTL NO.
2010-N06, INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPLORATION PLANS, DEVELOPMENT AND
PRODUCTION PLANS, AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS COORDINATION DOCUMENTS ON THE
OCS
(June
18,
2010),
available
at
http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=3
5724.
197. Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Interior Issues Directive Strengthening
Blowout Prevention Requirements for Offshore Oil and Gas Operations (June 18, 2010),
available
at
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Interior-Issues-DirectiveStrengthening- Blowout-Prevention-Requirements-for-Offshore-Oil-and-Gas-Operations
.cfm?renderforprint=1&.
198. Id; see also Nat’l Notice of Dep’t of Interior, Minerals Mgmt. Serv., supra note
196, at 2–3.
199. Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Salazar Announces Regulations to Strengthen
Drilling Safety, Reduce Risk of Human Error on Offshore Oil and Gas Operations para. 1
(Sept. 30, 2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-AnnouncesRegulations-to-Strengthen-Drilling-Safety-Reduce-Risk-of-Human-Error-on-OffshoreOil-and-Gas-Operations.cfm?renderforprint=1&.
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new standards for, and obtain independent third-party certification of,
well casing and cementing; document blowout preventer inspections and
maintenance; obtain independent verification of subsea well control
equipment; and more.200 The workplace safety rule will “require
operators to develop and implement Safety and Environmental
Management Systems (SEMS).”201 SEMS are “comprehensive safety
and environmental impact program[s] designed to reduce human and
organizational errors as the root cause of work-related accidents and
offshore oil spills.”202
Later in the year, DOI issued another NTL: No. 2010-N10 (NTL
10).203 NTL 10 applies to operators using subsea blowout preventers or
surface blowout preventers on floating facilities.204 It requires operators
to submit, with each application for a well permit, a statement by an
authorized company official that asserts that the operator will conduct its
activities in compliance with all applicable regulations, including the
new drilling safety rule.205 NTL 10 also confirms that BOEM will
evaluate whether the operator has submitted information adequate to
demonstrate “that it has access to and can deploy containment resources”
adequate to respond promptly to “a blowout or other loss of well
control.”206
In January 2011, DOI announced the creation of an Offshore Energy
Safety Advisory Committee, designed “to provide advice on matters and
actions relating to offshore energy safety, including, but not limited to
drilling and workplace safety, well intervention and containment, and oil

200. See Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf—
Increased Safety Measures for Energy Development on the Outer Continental Shelf, 75
Fed. Reg. 63,346, 63,351 (Oct. 14, 2010) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250).
201. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf—Safety and
Environmental Management Systems: Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,610, 63,610 (Oct. 15,
2010) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250).
202. Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 199, para. 8.
203. NAT’L NOTICE TO LESSEES AND OPERATORS OF FED. OIL AND GAS LEASES, OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF (OCS), DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT.,
REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT, NTL NO. 2010-N10, STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH
APPLICABLE REGULATIONS AND EVALUATION OF INFORMATION DEMONSTRATING
ADEQUATE SPILL RESPONSE AND WELL CONTAINMENT RESOURCES (Nov. 8, 2010),
available
at
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=
70560.
204. Id. at 1.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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spill response.”207 “The Committee will also facilitate collaborative
research and development, training and execution in these and other
areas relating to offshore energy safety.”208
C. Congressional Response to the Deepwater Horizon Disaster
Congress also took action in response to the Deepwater Horizon
disaster. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate prepared
legislative language designed to address flaws in the laws governing
OCS oil and gas activities and oil spill liability and response. The
primary legislative vehicle for OCS-related reform in the House of
Representatives was H.R. 3534, the Consolidated Land, Energy, and
Aquatic Resources Act of 2010 (CLEAR Act).209 Title I of the CLEAR
Act would have abolished the MMS and replaced it with a series of three
new agencies within DOI.210 Provisions in Title II would have made
important amendments to OCSLA.211 For example, it would have made
changes to OSCLA’s policy statement;212 established new OCS leasing
standards;213 provided for mandatory funding to support protection,
maintenance, and restoration of ocean and coastal ecosystems;214
strengthened requirements for exploration plans and eliminated the
thirty-day deadline for approval of such plans;215 required additional
consideration of environmental factors and consultation with the
Secretary of Commerce when preparing five-year OCS oil and gas
leasing programs;216 and more. Title V of the CLEAR Act would have
established restoration and scientific research and monitoring programs
for the Gulf of Mexico;217 Title VI would have enacted provisions
designed to facilitate coordinated, multi-sector planning for OCS

207. Establishment of the Ocean Energy Safety Advisory Committee, 76 Fed. Reg.
4,128, 4,129 (Jan. 24, 2011).
208. Id.
209. Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2010, H.R. 3534,
111th Cong. (2010).
210. Id. §§ 101–103, 106, 107.
211. See generally id. Title II, Subtitle A.
212. Id. § 203.
213. Id. § 205.
214. Id. § 207(d); see also id. § 605 (establishing Ocean Resources Conservation and
Assistance Fund).
215. Consolidated Land, Energy, and Aquatic Resources Act of 2010, H.R. 3534, §
208, 111th Cong. (2010).
216. See id. § 209.
217. Id. §§ 501, 502.
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activities;218 and Title VII would have made significant changes to the
existing laws governing oil spill liability and response.219 The House of
Representatives passed the CLEAR Act on July 30, 2010.220
In the Senate, the primary legislative response to the Deepwater
Horizon disaster was S. 3663, the Clean Energy Jobs and Oil Spill
Accountability Act of 2010.221 Like the CLEAR Act, the Senate bill
contained provisions that would have restructured DOI’s administration
of OCS activities,222 amended OCSLA,223 changed laws governing oil
spill liability and response,224 and established a long-term research and
monitoring program for the Gulf of Mexico,225 among other things.
Unlike the CLEAR Act, however, the Senate bill was not passed. As a
result, as of this writing, Congress has not enacted any significant
legislation to reform the governance of OCS oil and gas activities.
IV. THE WORK AHEAD: REMAINING SHORTCOMINGS IN THE OCS
FRAMEWORK AND RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS
The Deepwater Horizon disaster generated intense scrutiny of the
planning and oversight of OCS oil and gas leasing and drilling. The
scrutiny revealed that the administration of OCS oil and gas activities
suffers from a range of serious shortcomings. For example: the OCS
policy set forth in OCSLA fails to prioritize protection of the marine
environment; OCSLA and its implementing regulations lack substantive,
enforceable standards sufficient to ensure safety and protect marine
ecosystems; environmental analysis of OCS activities is deficient; oil
spill planning and preparedness is inadequate; and OCS oil and gas
activities are not well integrated with other ocean uses. This Section
describes these shortcomings in more detail, and recommends changes
that would improve the policies and practices that govern OCS oil and
gas activities.

218. See id. §§ 601–603.
219. See generally id. Title VII.
220. See 114 CONG. REC. D888 (daily ed. July 30, 2010).
221. Clean Energy Jobs and Oil Spill Accountability Act of 2010, S. 3663, 111th Cong.
(2010).
222. Id. § 305.
223. See, e.g., id. §§ 304, 306.
224. See, e.g., id. §§ 102, 104.
225. Id. § 615.
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A. Prioritizing the Protection of Marine Ecosystems in OCS Policy
The policy set forth in OCSLA states in part that the OCS should be
made available for “expeditious and orderly development, subject to
environmental safeguards.”226 This policy falls short because it fails to
make protection of coastal and marine ecosystems the paramount policy
objective.
Under the existing OCS policy, BOEM has focused on the extraction
of oil and gas and has treated protection of the coastal and marine
environment as a secondary consideration. For example, the National
Commission that investigated the Deepwater Horizon disaster noted that
staff at BOEM “have reported that [agency] leasing coordinators and
managers discouraged them from reaching conclusions about potential
environmental impacts that would increase the burden on lessees, ‘thus
causing unnecessary delays for operators.’”227 The National Commission
noted that several BOEM scientists reported that “their managers
believed the result of NEPA evaluations should always be a ‘green light’
to proceed” with oil and gas activities.228 The National Commission also
discovered that some managers within BOEM “reportedly ‘changed or
minimized the [BOEM] scientists’ potential environmental impact
findings in [NEPA] documents to expedite’” the approval of plans for oil
and gas activity.229 Similarly, a March 2010 Government Accountability
Office study observed that BOEM “has . . . been vulnerable to
allegations by stakeholders and former [BOEM] scientists of suppression
or alteration of their work on environmental issues.”230 Further, a DOI
Inspector General Report found that in one case, a manager at BOEM
told a scientist who raised environmental concerns “to change his
findings and, if he did not, ‘someone else would do it [for him].’”231
Changing the overall OCS policy to one that prioritizes the
protection of ocean ecosystems will not, on its own, prevent these kinds
of abuses. However, changing the policy may contribute to a cultural
shift at BOEM and may help foster a work environment in which BOEM
managers no longer feel pressured to expedite OCS oil and gas projects
226. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(3) (2006).
227. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 82.
228. Id.
229. Id. (second alteration in original).
230. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT:
ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE WOULD HELP STRENGTHEN THE MINERALS MANAGEMENT
SERVICE’S ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS IN THE NORTH ALEUTIAN BASIN 24
(2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10276.pdf.
231. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 160, at 34.
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at the expense of the environment.232 Changing the policy would also
help ensure that governance of offshore oil and gas activities is
consistent with the National Ocean Policy’s call to “protect, maintain,
and restore the health and biological diversity of ocean, coastal, and
Great Lakes ecosystems and resources.”233
Congress should amend OCSLA’s policy statement to state that
protection, maintenance, and restoration of coastal and ocean ecosystems
is the paramount OCS policy objective, and extraction of mineral
resources should be permitted only when it will not compromise that
objective. If Congress fails to amend OCSLA’s policy statement, BOEM
should use its authority under existing law to implement the policy in a
manner that offers the greatest protection to ocean and coastal
ecosystems.234 Either way, BOEM should use its discretion to ensure
that it authorizes OCS oil and gas lease sales, exploratory drilling, and
development and production only when science shows that such actions
can proceed with minimal risk to the health of ocean and coastal
ecosystems.
B. Creating Substantive, Enforceable Standards to Govern OCS
Operations
In general, the statutory and regulatory provisions governing OCS oil
and gas activities do not contain strong environmental standards.
Although OCSLA requires BOEM to “balance” the potential benefits of
oil and gas activities with risks to human, marine, and coastal
environments,235 and to “consider” impacts to marine ecosystems,236
232. Cf. id. at 35 (recommending that BOEM explore and encourage internal policies
“that promote a culture of balanced stewardship”).
233. Exec. Order No. 13547, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,023, 43,023 (July 22, 2010). The
National Ocean Policy also includes calls for “improv[ing] the resiliency of ocean,
coastal, and Great Lakes ecosystems, communities, and economies,” and “us[ing] the
best available science and knowledge to inform decisions affecting the ocean, our coasts,
and the Great Lakes.” Id.
234. Pursuant to the executive order announcing the National Ocean Policy, BOEM
must use its discretion to implement the National Ocean Policy’s call to protect, maintain,
and restore ocean and coastal ecosystems. See id. at 43,026 (requiring “[a]ll executive
departments, agencies, and offices . . . whose actions affect the ocean, our coasts, and the
Great Lakes” to implement the National Ocean Policy and associated principles and
objectives “to the fullest extent consistent with applicable law”).
235. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3) (2006) (requiring the Secretary of the Interior to
“select the timing and location of leasing . . . so as to obtain a proper balance between the
potential for environmental damage, the potential for the discovery of oil and gas, and the
potential for adverse impact on the coastal zone” (emphasis added)).

302

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:2

these requirements are not substantive, enforceable standards.
Consequently, they do not ensure a minimum level of protection for the
marine environment, species, or habitats. Absent rigorous environmental
standards, BOEM has the discretion to assign great weight to the benefits
of oil and gas development and relatively little weight to the
environmental risks of such development. Similarly, absent substantive,
enforceable standards, there is no guarantee that BOEM’s
“consideration” of environmental impacts will lead to meaningful in-thewater protections.
Meaningful standards are necessary to ensure that OCS decisionmakers not only “balance” and “consider” the health of marine
ecosystems, but also take concrete steps to protect those ecosystems from
potential threats. For example, a new standard should be implemented to
ensure that federal regulators have adequate baseline scientific
information before they make decisions about leasing, exploration, or
development. Another standard should be added to require federal
regulators to identify and provide for the protection of important
ecological areas before OCS areas are opened to oil and gas leasing. Still
another should require operators to demonstrate the ability to respond
effectively to an oil spill in real-world conditions before those operators
conduct site-specific oil and gas activities, and to use the highest possible
safety and technology practices. Congress could add such substantive
standards to OCSLA through an amendment, or BOEM could use its
discretion to implement environmental protection standards through the
promulgation of new regulations or policies.
1. Creating a Standard for Baseline Science
Baseline scientific information can be used to inform decisions about
whether, when, and where to allow OCS oil and gas activities. In
addition, baseline science is necessary in the natural resource damage
assessment process following an oil spill because the impacts of the spill
must be measured against the environmental baseline that existed prior to

236. See, e.g., id. § 1344(a)(1) (“Management of the outer Continental Shelf shall be
conducted in a manner which considers economic, social, and environmental values . . .
and the potential impact of oil and gas exploration on other resource values . . . and the
marine, coastal, and human environments.” (emphasis added)); see also id. § 1344(a)(2)
(requiring the Secretary of the Interior to determine the timing and location of oil and gas
activities “based on a consideration of” a variety of factors including, but not limited to
“the relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity of different areas” of the
OCS (emphasis added)).
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the spill.237 To ensure that decision-makers have adequate baseline
science about OCS areas that may be subject to oil and gas activities,
Congress or BOEM should implement standards that require the
availability of specific types and quantities of baseline scientific
information. This information might include information on physical
characteristics—such as data on the benthic environment, ocean currents,
wind and weather patterns, and water temperature and salinity—as well
as information about the ecosystem, such as the presence, distribution,
and abundance of species and the web of relationships among those
species. Pursuant to these proposed baseline science standards, BOEM
would not be authorized to make an area of the OCS available for leasing
until the required type and quantity of baseline data is available for that
area.238
2. Ensuring Protection of Important Ecological Areas
Important ecological areas include, but are not limited to, important
ocean habitats, areas of high productivity, migratory pathways, and areas
important for subsistence purposes.239
Under the current OCS
framework, BOEM is under no obligation to take steps to identify and
protect important ecological areas from the effects of industrial
development, such as oil and gas activity. Instead, in the vast regions of
the OCS open to leasing, the oil and gas industry has enormous control
over the location of development. Oil and gas companies have no
obligation to heed underlying ecological values, and they can choose
lease sites from the millions or tens of millions of acres that BOEM
237. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 990.52 (2010) (noting that natural resource trustees “must
quantify the degree, and spatial and temporal extent of such injuries relative to baseline”);
see also id. § 990.30 (defining “baseline” as “the condition of the natural resources and
services that would have existed had the [oil spill] incident not occurred”).
238. The need for baseline science information is particularly acute in the Arctic OCS.
See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 303 (“[S]cientific research on the
ecosystems of the Arctic is difficult and expensive. Good information exists for only a
few species, and even for those, just for certain times of the year or in certain areas.”).
“As a result, the Commission recommend[ed] an immediate, comprehensive federal
research effort to provide a foundation of scientific information on the Arctic (with
periodic review by the National Academy of Sciences), and annual stock assessments for
marine mammals, fish, and birds that use the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas.” Id.
239. See MELANIE A. SMITH, ARCTIC MARINE SYNTHESIS: ATLAS OF THE CHUKCHI AND
BEAUFORT SEAS 1-8 (2010) (defining important ecological areas as “areas in the ocean
that disproportionately contribute to the health and biodiversity of the ocean ecosystem
and therefore mandate special considerations and appropriate protections during coastal
and marine spatial planning as well as in other management decisions”).
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makes available.240 To promote healthy and resilient ocean ecosystems,
important ecological areas must be identified and protected before
BOEM allows industrial activities to proceed.241 To achieve this
objective, Congress should amend OCSLA—or BOEM should amend its
regulations or policies—to add a standard that requires federal regulators
to gather information for the different regions of the OCS and identify
important ecological areas within those regions. The proposed standard
should ensure that regulatory agencies preserve the vitality of important
ecological areas by requiring operators to meet specific and stringent
precautions before they conduct on-water activities.
3. Raising the Bar on Oil Spill Response
As noted above, OCS operators must prepare oil spill response plans
for their OCS facilities. These documents must contain “a plan for
responding, to the maximum extent practicable, to a worst case
discharge,”242 and must “identify, and ensure . . . the availability of,
private personnel and equipment necessary to remove to the maximum
extent practicable a worst case discharge (including a discharge resulting
from fire or explosion), and to mitigate or prevent a substantial threat of
such a discharge.” 243 However, neither the statutory language nor the
implementing regulations require OCS operators to demonstrate that
their spill response plan will work.244
For example, estimates following the Deepwater Horizon disaster
reveal that despite the massive effort that BP activated to clean up the oil
spill,245 response efforts were able to remove or chemically disperse only
about one-third of the oil that was discharged from the Macondo well.246
The National Commission determined that “[t]he technology available
240. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
241. The National Commission recommended that, “[i]n less well-explored areas,
[BOEM] should reduce the size of lease sales so their geographic scope allows for a
meaningful analysis of potential environmental impacts and identification of areas of
ecological significance.” NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 262 (emphasis added).
242. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i) (2006).
243. Id. § 1321(j)(5)(D)(iii).
244. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 132-133 (describing glaring errors in
plan).
245. Id. at 133 (showing that, at its peak, more than 45,000 people were involved in the
response effort).
246. See LUBCHENCO ET AL., supra note 4, Figure I (estimating that of the 4.9 million
barrels of oil that was discharged, responders recovered 17 percent directly from the
wellhead, skimmed 3 percent, burned 5 percent, and chemically dispersed 8 percent, for a
total of 33 percent).
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for cleaning up oil spills has improved only incrementally since 1990,”
that “[f]ederal research and development programs in this area are
underfunded,” and that the major oil companies have committed minimal
resources to in-house research and development related to spill response
technology.”247
To spur better on-water cleanup results—and more investment in
research and development for response technologies—Congress or
BOEM should implement stringent oil spill response standards.
Regulators should require operators to demonstrate the ability to meet
specific performance standards in real-world conditions in the lease area
before allowing operators to conduct drilling operations.
The
performance standards should require operators to demonstrate, in
simulated field trials, that they have in place adequate equipment, trained
personnel, and resources to respond effectively in the event of a
catastrophic spill. Operators should be required to show that they can
deploy their resources in real-world conditions, and that the chosen
equipment is effective in meeting an established oil removal performance
target. These spill response standards should be enforced through
independent third-party review of facility response plans and regular
audits during the period of exploration and production.
4. Promoting Safety and Technology on the OCS
OCS oil and gas operations should also be subject to tougher safety
and technology standards. A DOI Inspector General Report concluded
that BOEM’s “process for developing or updating standards and
regulations has not kept pace with new and emerging offshore
technologies.”248 Congress or BOEM should require operators of all new
offshore leases to demonstrate that they are using the most effective
safety technology for exploration or development activity as a
precondition to drilling.249
Standards regarding spill prevention
technologies should be implemented, as well. These might require
redundant engineering controls such as multiple blowout prevention
247. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 269.
248. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 160, at 44.
249. At present, OCSLA calls for “the use of the best available and safest
technologies[,]” and this mandate applies “on all new drilling and production operations
and, wherever practicable, on existing operations.” 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b) (2006).
However, this provision is weakened significantly by certain caveats: it applies only to
certain types of equipment, and the Secretary of the Interior may waive the requirement if
he determines that the additional cost of using the “best” or “safest” technology
outweighs the additional benefits of using the technology. Id.
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systems, on-site blowout containment structures, and double-walled
pipes or tanks. All OCS leases should be required to incorporate the
most environmentally protective timing and location stipulations, along
with other terms designed to reduce the potential for environmental
damage and adverse impacts on the coastal zone.
C. Improving Environmental Analysis of OCS Oil and Gas Activities
BOEM’s current approach to OCS planning and evaluation of
proposed oil and gas activities fails to ensure rigorous analysis of
potential impacts and risks. Congress or BOEM—working with other
administrative agencies—should institute multiple changes to improve
the process. For example, federal agencies other than BOEM should
have a greater role in planning and conducting environmental analyses
for OCS oil and gas activities. To make environmental review more
meaningful, five-year OCS oil and gas leasing programs and individual
OCS lease sales should focus on smaller, more targeted areas of the
OCS; multi-million acre “area-wide” lease sales should be eliminated.
NEPA analysis of offshore oil and gas activities must be improved to
ensure that federal decision-makers conduct thorough analysis at all
phases of the OCSLA process. To facilitate environmental analysis at
the exploration plan stage, Congress should eliminate the provision of
OCSLA that requires approval of an exploration plan within thirty days
of submission.250
1. Engaging Expert Agencies Beyond BOEM
Under the current framework, expert federal agencies other than
BOEM have limited ability to shape BOEM’s analysis of the impacts of
oil and gas leasing programs, OCS lease sales, and other offshore oil and
gas activities.251 NOAA, for example, has broad oceans expertise252 and
should be an equal partner with BOEM in initial decisions about
whether, when, and where to permit oil and gas activities on the OCS.
Greater involvement by NOAA will help ensure that environmental
analyses for OCS planning and leasing decisions include a proper range
250. See 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(1).
251. See NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 262 (noting that while BOEM must
“consider” comments from other expert agencies, it is not obligated to respond to those
comments or give them any particular weight).
252. See id. (describing NOAA as “the nation’s ocean agency with the most expertise
in marine science and the management of living marine resources”).
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of reasonable alternatives and assess accurately the environmental risks
associated with oil and gas activities.
Congress should amend OCSLA to give these other agencies a
greater role in environmental analysis and decision making regarding
OCS oil and gas activities. For example, the National Commission
recommended that Congress amend OCSLA “to provide NOAA with a
formal consultative role during the development of the five-year lease
plan and lease sale stages.”253
In the absence of congressional action, BOEM should use its existing
discretion to reach out to other federal agencies to initiate a more formal
interagency consultation process for decisions relating to the planning
and carrying out of OCS oil and gas activities. The National
Commission recommended that “NOAA and other federal agencies with
appropriate expertise should be encouraged to act as cooperating
agencies in NEPA reviews of offshore energy production activities,
including exploration and development plans and drilling permit
applications.”254 It also recommended that “[f]ederal agencies that
submit comments to [BOEM] as part of a NEPA process should receive a
written response indicating how the information was applied and if it was
not included, why it was not included.”255
BOEM has already taken a step toward greater cooperation with
NOAA: on December 1, 2010, the BOEM Director, Michael R.
Bromwich, announced that he was “in the process of completing an
agreement with the [NOAA] through which NOAA will collaborate with
[BOEM] in the environmental analyses for OCS planning.”256 BOEM
should consider similar agreements with other expert agencies, including
the EPA and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.257 In addition, when
reviewing spill response plans for OCS facilities, BOEM should seek to
partner with the Coast Guard—the expert agency tasked with overseeing
spill response for offshore facilities.258
Finally, at every phase of the OCSLA process, BOEM and other
federal agencies should solicit, consider, and incorporate local and
253. Id. at 264.
254. Id. at 265.
255. Id.
256. Press Release, Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt., Salazar Announces Revised OCS
Leasing Program: Key Modifications Based on Ongoing Reforms, Unparalleled Safety
and Environmental Standards, and Rigorous Scientific Review para. 6 (Dec. 1, 2010),
available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Announces-Revised-OCSLeasing-Program.cfm.
257. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 262.
258. See supra Part II(B)(2) of this Article.

308

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:2

traditional knowledge from affected communities into the decisionmaking process. This would ensure that expert concerns are heard from
the outset, and may help avoid later complications. Affected states and
local governments must also be partners in the preparation of NEPA
analyses.
2. Narrowing the Geographic Scope of OCS Lease Sales
As noted above, recent five-year oil and gas leasing programs and
individual lease sales have included planning areas that are millions or
tens of millions of acres in size.259 An environmental analysis of
potential impacts on an area that is millions or tens of millions of acres in
size cannot account adequately for the variability that exists across the
planning area, nor can it anticipate adequately site-specific impacts. The
National Commission observed that “OCS lease sales cover such large
geographic areas that meaningful NEPA review is difficult.”260 It
recommended that planning areas included in OCS lease sales should be
restricted to smaller geographic areas to promote more meaningful
environmental analysis.261
3. Using “Tiering” Appropriately
As discussed above, the OCSLA process is segmented into four
distinct stages; these stages step down from a broad, national-level plan
to a regional lease sale to a site-specific action, such as an exploration
plan or development and production plan.262 It has also been noted
above that NEPA regulations encourage federal agencies to “tier”
environmental analyses to avoid duplication and focus on critical
issues.263 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia observed
that BOEM “may issue a broader EIS at the earlier ‘need and site
selection’ stage of a program, and issue subsequent, more detailed
259. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
260. See NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 261.
261. See id. (noting the expansive area of several recent OCS lease sales and observing
that “it is appropriate to conduct environmental reviews on a finer geographic scale
before private-sector commitments of this magnitude are made to purchase leases.”); cf.
id. at 262 (recommending that BOEM reduce the size of lease sales “in less well explored
areas,” so that the “geographic scope [of the lease sale] allows for a meaningful analysis
of potential environmental impacts and identification of areas of ecological
significance”).
262. See supra Part II(A)(1) – (4) of this Article.
263. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20 (2010); see also id. § 1508.28 (defining “tiering”).
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environmental impact statements at the program’s later, more sitespecific stage.”264 BOEM, however, has improperly exploited the
segmented nature of the OCSLA process to avoid thorough NEPA
analysis. The National Commission determined that BOEM’s brand of
tiering “created a system where deeper environmental analysis at more
geographically targeted and advanced planning stages did not always
take place.”265 Similarly, the Council on Environmental Quality
observed that BOEM’s use of tiering “was not transparent . . . and has
led to confusion and concern about whether environmental impacts were
sufficiently evaluated and disclosed.”266
In the Arctic, for example, BOEM prepared a nationwide,
programmatic EIS for the original 2007 to 2012 OCS oil and gas leasing
program.267 At the second stage of OCSLA, in support of Chukchi Sea
Lease Sale 193, the agency prepared another broad EIS that purported to
analyze potential environmental impacts for an area of about 34 million
acres.268 At the third stage, when BOEM evaluated the potential
environmental impacts of proposed exploration plans on leases sold in
Lease Sale 193, the agency did not follow the path laid out by the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Instead of preparing a “more
detailed environmental impact statement[ ]” at this “later, more sitespecific stage,” BOEM prepared less detailed EAs.269 In so doing,
BOEM deprived itself and the public of a more rigorous environmental
analysis, and deprived the public of the opportunity for meaningful
comment.
Going forward, BOEM must reform its implementation of NEPA to
ensure that it analyzes adequately site-specific OCS oil and gas activities.
The Council on Environmental Quality recommends that the agency
“reexamine its NEPA implementation policies to ensure that its use of
tiering is both clear and well-defined, and is not being used to limit sitespecific environmental analysis.”270
The National Commission
recommends that BOEM develop a NEPA handbook that addresses the
issue of tiering, and “provide[s] guidelines for applying NEPA in a

264. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Dep’t of the Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 474 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28).
265. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 260.
266. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 125, at 3.
267. See generally 2007–2012 FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM FEIS, supra note 144.
268. See generally LEASE SALE 193 FEIS, supra note 144, at I-2.
269. See, e.g., 2009 BEAUFORT EA supra note 145; 2009 CHUKCHI EA, supra note 145.
270. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 125, at 23.

310

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:2

consistent, transparent, and appropriate manner to decisions affecting
OCS oil and gas activities.”271
4. Eliminating the Use of Categorical Exclusions for OCS Drilling
Activities
Under NEPA regulations, categorical exclusions are appropriate only
for those actions that “do not individually or cumulatively have a
significant effect on the human environment.”272 BOEM, however,
created categorical exclusions for actions that can and do have significant
effects on the environment.
For example, BOEM created a categorical exclusion for the
“[a]pproval of an offshore lease or unit exploration[,]
development/production plan[,] or a Development Operation
Coordination Document in the central or western Gulf of Mexico.” 273
The categorical exclusion was inapplicable to plans or documents that
presented particularly high risks, such as facilities in areas that posed a
“high seismic risk” or that used “new or unusual technology.”274
Nonetheless, BOEM used the categorical exclusion to justify its decision
to approve—without preparing an EA or EIS—BP’s plan to use an oil rig
floating in nearly 5,000 feet of water to drill an exploration well that
would penetrate roughly two-and-a-half miles below the seabed.275
The impacts associated with even normal drilling operations include
noise, air, and water pollution, as well as increased vessel and air
traffic.276 When BP lost control of the Macondo well and the Deepwater
Horizon burst into flames on April 20, 2010, it demonstrated graphically
something that should have been obvious all along: all OCS drilling
activities carry with them the potential for a catastrophic oil spill. Given
271. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 261.
272. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2010).
273. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., DEP’T OF INTERIOR, DEPARTMENTAL MANUAL
§
15.4(C)(10)
(2004),
available
at
http://elips.doi.gov/app_dm/act_getfiles.cfm?relnum=3625.
274. Id.
275. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 125, at 19–20; see also NATIONAL
COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 3 (noting water depth and depth of the formation targeted
by the Macondo well).
276. See, e.g., 2009 CHUKCHI EA, supra note 145, at 29 (discussing noise generated
by drilling equipment from proposed exploratory drilling); id. at 27 (discussing air
emissions from proposed exploratory drilling); id. at 26 (noting that discharges from
proposed exploration drilling would include “cement slurry, drainage waters, and
domestic wastewaters”; id. at 22–25 (discussing air and vessel traffic associated with
proposed exploratory drilling).
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the actual and potential impacts of OCS drilling operations, it is
unreasonable to assume—as BOEM did—that such operations do not
have a significant effect on the human environment. As a result, OCS
drilling operations are not eligible to be categorically excluded from
environmental review under NEPA.277 BOEM should revise its
Department Manual to eliminate categorical exclusions for OCS drilling
activities. In the future, all OCS drilling activities should be subject to
some level of site-specific NEPA analysis, either an EA or EIS.
5. Ensuring Appropriate Analysis of Low-Probability, High-Risk Events
The BP Deepwater Horizon disaster highlighted the risk of failing to
engage in worst-case oil spill planning. When making decisions that
involve the potential for catastrophic result—such as a major oil spill—
BOEM’s environmental analyses must take seriously the potential for
disaster; this is true even if the probability of such a disaster is low.278
BOEM failed to analyze this type of low-probability, high-risk event
when it prepared EAs for proposed exploration activities in the Beaufort
and Chukchi seas. BOEM’s EAs stated that “[a] very large spill from a
well-control incident is not a reasonably foreseeable event in connection
with the OCS exploration activities set forth in Shell’s 2010 exploration
plan, and therefore, this EA does not analyze the impacts of such a
worst-case scenario.”279 Instead of analyzing a potential blowout
scenario, the EA for Shell’s exploration plan for the Chukchi Sea
dismissed the possibility of a major spill and reviewed instead the effects
of a small, 48-barrel fuel transfer spill.280
In the future, BOEM must analyze low-probability, high-risk events
to ensure that it is prepared for a worst-case disaster. The Council on
Environmental Quality concludes that, in light of the Deepwater Horizon
disaster, BOEM must “take steps to incorporate catastrophic risk
analysis.”281 Likewise, the National Commission recommends that
BOEM “incorporate the ‘worst-case scenario’ calculations from industry
277. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2010).
278. See, e.g., id. § 1502.22(b)(4) (noting that in a NEPA analysis when information is
missing or unavailable, “reasonably foreseeable” impacts include “impacts which have
catastrophic consequences, even if their probability of occurrence is low, provided that
the analysis of the impacts is supported by credible scientific evidence, is not based on
pure conjecture, and is within the rule of reason”).
279. 2009 BEAUFORT EA, supra note 145, at A-2; 2009 CHUKCHI EA, supra note 145,
at A-2.
280. 2009 CHUKCHI EA, supra note 145, at 31-32.
281. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 125, at 27.
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oil spill response plans into NEPA documents and other environmental
analyses or reviews” to inform the agency’s “estimates for potential oil
spill situations in its environmental analyses.”282
6. Eliminating the Thirty-Day Deadline for Approval of Exploration
Plans
OCSLA requires BOEM to approve an exploration plan within thirty
days of the date the exploration plan is submitted.283 The thirty-day
requirement does not preclude BOEM from conducting a thorough
environmental analysis, which might include the preparation of an EIS.
BOEMRE could, for example, complete the NEPA analysis before it
deems an exploration plan submitted. Indeed, the National Commission
recommends that BOEM not consider exploration plans “officially
‘submitted’ until all of the required content, necessary environmental
reviews, and other analyses are complete and adequate to provide a
sound basis for decision-making.”284
Nonetheless, OCSLA’s thirty-day requirement may tempt BOEM to
rush its environmental analyses, or skip them altogether through the use
of categorical exclusions. Attempting to perform a NEPA analysis for an
exploration plan in thirty days would likely result in an inadequate
analysis and would certainly provide little opportunity for public review
and comment.
As the National Commission suggests, “[i]f
environmental review is to occur after plan submission, [the thirty-day]
timetable effectively precludes the kind of exacting review necessary to
ensure that [NEPA’s] environmental safeguards can be achieved.”285
Congress should eliminate the thirty-day deadline under which BOEM
must approve a “submitted” exploration plan to facilitate more rigorous
NEPA analysis.286
D. Improving Agency Review of Oil Spill Response Plans and Promoting
Better Oil Spill Cleanup Technology
BOEM’s review of facility oil spill response plans fails to ensure that
owners and operators will be able to respond effectively in the event of
282. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 267.
283. See 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c)(1) (2006).
284. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 262.
285. Id. at 80.
286. Cf. id. at 262 (recommending that Congress change OCSLA’s existing thirty-day
deadline to a sixty-day deadline).
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major oil spills. In addition, current laws, regulations, and policies have
failed to promote advances in oil spill cleanup technologies.
1. Improving Agency Review of Oil Spill Response Plans
Oil spill response plans must be subject to more stringent review and
analysis. Existing law tasks BOEM with reviewing oil spill response
plans for OCS facilities, but evidence suggests that the agency has not
taken this responsibility seriously.287
For example, BOEM apparently did not question the oil spill
response plan that covered BP’s Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico,
even though that spill plan “identified three different worst-case
scenarios that ranged from 28,033 to 250,000 barrels of oil discharge and
used identical language to ‘analyze’ the shoreline impacts under each
scenario.”288 The same spill plan also referenced walruses, sea lions, and
sea otters—species that do not occur in the Gulf of Mexico.289 In the
Arctic, BOEM approved an oil spill response plan in which Shell
Offshore, Inc. claimed that it would recover 90 percent of the oil spilled
during a worst case discharge from its proposed facility in the Beaufort
Sea290—even though a 90 percent recovery rate is unquestionably
unrealistic. In earlier Arctic planning documents, BOEM acknowledged
that “[o]n average, spill-response efforts result in recovery of
approximately 10-20 % of the oil released to the ocean environment.”291
And as noted earlier, despite the massive spill response effort that
followed the Deepwater Horizon blowout, only one-third of the oil that
was discharged from the Macondo well was recovered or treated with
287. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 84 (concluding that BOEM did
not “evidence[ ] serious attention to detail” when it approved the spill plan that was
applicable to BP’s Macondo well, and noting that at least four other oil spill response
plans for OCS facilities in the Gulf of Mexico contained the same error).
288. Id. at 84.
289. BP, REGIONAL OIL SPILL RESPONSE PLAN – GULF OF MEXICO § 11 fig. 11-3 (2009);
see also NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 84 (noting that the spill plan “described
biological resources nonexistent in the Gulf [of Mexico]”).
290. See SHELL OFFSHORE INC., BEAUFORT SEA REGIONAL EXPLORATION OIL
DISCHARGE PREVENTION AND CONTINGENCY P LAN 1-29 (2010), available at
http://alaska.boemre.gov/fo/ODPCPs/2010_Beaufort_cplan.pdf.
(assuming that only 10 percent of the discharge from a hypothetical blowout will
“escape[ ] primary offshore recovery efforts”); id. at unmarked page following I-12
(containing BOEM approval letter).
291. MINERALS MGMT. SERV., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, BEAUFORT
SEA PLANNING AREA OIL AND GAS LEASE SALES 186, 195, AND 202, IV-17 (2003),
available at http://alaska.boemre.gov/ref/EIA_EA/2003_001.pdf.
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dispersants.292 This kind of uncritical review led DOI’s Office of
Inspector General to conclude that BOEM’s review of oil spill response
plans “does not ensure that critical data are correct.”293
To facilitate more serious review of oil spill response plans for
offshore facilities, broaden the scope of review, and promote better
information sharing among federal agencies involved in spill response
efforts—including the Coast Guard, NOAA, and EPA—Congress should
require multiple federal agencies to review and approve these plans. In
the absence of Congressional action, DOI should work with other
agencies to establish formal mechanisms for interagency review of oil
spill response plans.294 The National Commission endorsed the idea of
interagency spill plan review:
In addition to the Department of the Interior, other agencies with
relevant scientific and operational expertise should play a role in
evaluating spill response plans to verify that operators can
conduct the response and containment operations detailed in
their plans. Specifically, oil spill response plans, including
source-control measures, should be subject to interagency review
and approval by the Coast Guard, EPA, and NOAA. Other parts
of the federal government, such as Department of Energy
national laboratories that possess relevant scientific expertise,
could be consulted.295
The National Commission also noted that interagency review of oil
spill response plans for OCS facilities would facilitate greater integration
of those plans with broader-level area contingency plans and regional
contingency plans because it would “involv[e] the agencies with primary
responsibility for government spill response planning in oversight of
industry planning.”296
In addition to interagency review of oil spill response plans for OCS
facilities, BOEM should allow for public comment on such plans: “Plans
should also be made available for a public comment period prior to final

292. LUBCHENCO ET AL., supra note 4, at 2.
293. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 160, at 44.
294. For example, the DOI Inspector General Report recommended that DOI “[d]raft a
new Memorandum of Agreement with the Coast Guard, EPA, and other interested
agencies, requiring appropriate participation of all parties in the review of [oil spill
response plans] and any related drills or exercises.” Id. at 49. Such an approach would
not require Congressional action.
295. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 266-67.
296. Id. at 267.
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approval and response plans should be made available to the public
following their approval.”297
2. Promoting Advances in Oil Spill Response Technologies
Current technologies for removing spilled oil are much the same
today as they were over twenty years ago, at the time of the Exxon
Valdez oil spill. This is not particularly surprising. As the National
Commission pointed out, “neither industry nor government has made
significant investments in improving the menu of response options or
significantly improved their effectiveness.”298
To ensure that research and development of oil spill response
technologies is not put off until the next catastrophic spill, Congress
should provide steady funding for federal agencies to promote and
conduct such research. The National Commission recommended that
Congress establish a funding mechanism that is not subject to the annual
appropriations process to “increase federal funding for oil spill response
research by agencies such as [DOI], the Coast Guard, EPA, and
NOAA—including NOAA’s Office of Response and Restoration.”299 In
addition, agencies may be able to increase their own focus on spill
response research.
For example, the DOI Inspector General
recommended that DOI “[c]onduct additional research on containment
and control measures to determine appropriate requirements for
containing oil discharge at the source.”300 As noted above, agencies can
also promote industry investment in oil spill response research and
development by instituting strict new performance standards that require
operators of OCS facilities to demonstrate the effectiveness of their spill
response equipment in real-world conditions before they are allowed to
conduct drilling activities.301
E. The Need For Multi-Sector Planning: Integrating OCS Oil and Gas
Activities with Other Ocean Uses
OCSLA is a single-sector statute that focuses almost exclusively on
oil and gas activities. Unsurprisingly, BOEM’s implementation of
OCSLA has shared that narrow focus. Under the existing framework,
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Id.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 270.
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 160, at 51.
See supra Part IV(B)(3).
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BOEM has viewed the ocean through an oil-and-gas lens. Its decisions
about offshore oil and gas activities—which may affect broad areas of
the ocean and impact other sectors of the economy302—have not been
integrated with decisions about other ocean uses. The result has been
fragmented and inefficient management, and a failure to prioritize the
health of ocean and coastal ecosystems. In the future, federal decisions
about OCS oil and gas activities should be incorporated into a
comprehensive framework that promotes integrated planning and
management. In addition, Congress should establish a permanently
appropriated, dedicated funding source for ocean and coastal
conservation and management.
1. Multi-Sector Planning
In July 2010, President Obama established the National Ocean
Council, an interagency body charged with providing direction to federal
agencies to ensure that those agencies implement the National Ocean
Policy and related objectives.303 The Council will also organize regional
coastal and marine spatial planning processes designed to foster “a more
integrated, comprehensive, ecosystem-based, flexible, and proactive
approach to planning and managing sustainable multiple uses across
sectors and improve the conservation of the ocean, our coasts, and the
Great Lakes.”304
The Secretary of the Interior, as a member of the National Ocean
Council,305 should ensure that BOEM and other relevant agencies within
DOI are active participants in National Ocean Council processes. Other
federal agencies involved in the planning and management of OCS oil
and gas activities should participate fully, as well. Participation in
interagency National Ocean Council processes will facilitate improved
communication and coordination among different agencies with respect
to decisions about oil and gas activities.

302. For example, the Deepwater Horizon disaster led NOAA to institute fishery
closures that, at their maximum, prohibited commercial fishing of more than one-third of
the Gulf of Mexico’s exclusive economic zone. See NOAA FISHERIES SERV., SOUTHEAST
REGIONAL OFFICE, DEEPWATER HORIZON/BP OIL SPILL: SIZE AND PERCENT COVERAGE OF
FISHING
AREA
CLOSURES
DUE
TO
BP
OIL
SPILL,
http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/ClosureSizeandPercentCoverage.htm (last updated Jan. 31,
2011).
303. See Exec. Order No. 13,547, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,023, 43,025 (July 22, 2010).
304. Id. at 43,023.
305. Id. at 43,024.

2011]

Shortcomings and Solutions

317

The involvement of BOEM and other federal agencies in regional
coastal and marine spatial planning processes—required by Executive
Order 13,547306—could be especially valuable. Coastal and marine
spatial planning will involve the assembly and synthesis of scientific
data, which will promote better understanding of marine and coastal
ecosystems and facilitate science-based management.307 The coastal and
marine spatial planning process will also help identify in advance
potential conflicts among different sectors or stakeholders, helping to
promote smarter, better-coordinated use of the ocean.308 The National
Commission concluded that “[i]ntegrating five-year [OCS] leasing plans
and associated leasing decisions with the coastal and marine spatial
planning process will be an important step toward assuring the
sustainable use of ocean and coastal ecosystems.”309
2. Funding for Ocean Conservation and Management
Ocean and coastal ecosystems are already under stress from
overexploitation, habitat degradation, coastal and marine pollution,
climate change, and ocean acidification. In the Gulf of Mexico, the
Deepwater Horizon disaster was another blow to an already-degraded
ocean environment.310 To address the significant threats to the health of
these ecosystems, Congress should establish a permanently appropriated,
dedicated funding source for ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes
conservation and management. Given the risks posed by OCS oil and
gas activities, a portion of the revenue generated from those activities
should be directed to a fund to support ocean protection, maintenance,
306. Id. at 43,026.
307. See COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
INTERAGENCY OCEAN POLICY TASK FORCE 66 (2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/OPTF_FinalRecs.pdf (noting that scientific
knowledge and data are essential to coastal and marine spatial planning); id. at 68-69
(explaining that the coastal and marine spatial planning process would develop “sciencebased decision-support tools, including models, assessments, and visualization
capabilities,” to facilitate marine and coastal planning and “synthesize information most
relevant” to decision-makers.).
308. See id. at 48 (noting that one principle of coastal and marine spatial planning is to
manage multiple existing and emerging uses “in a manner that reduces conflict, enhances
compatibility among uses and with sustained ecosystem functions and services, provides
for public access, and increases certainty and predictability for economic investments.”).
309. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 263.
310. See Exec. Order No. 13,554, 75 Fed. Reg. 62,313, 62,313 (Oct. 8, 2010)
(observing that the Gulf of Mexico ecosystem had suffered a “longstanding ecological
decline” even before the Deepwater Horizon disaster).
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and restoration—including research and monitoring, such as ocean
observing systems. Specifically, Congress should create a trust fund
capitalized annually at a minimum of ten percent of revenues derived
from offshore oil and gas energy development. The fund should be used
to finance activities and projects that satisfy criteria designed to ensure
that they benefit protection, maintenance, and restoration of marine
ecosystem health.
V. NEW FRONTIERS: PROTECTING ARCTIC MARINE ECOSYSTEMS FROM
AN EXPANSION OF OCS OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES
Although the Gulf of Mexico region has produced the vast majority
of OCS oil and gas to date,311 the Beaufort and Chukchi seas off the coast
of Alaska’s North Slope may be the next frontier in OCS oil and gas
exploration, due to “the likelihood of finding significant new sources of
oil” in the region.312 The reforms described above will improve
governance of OCS oil and gas activities no matter where they take
place. However, OCS operations in remote Arctic waters pose increased
challenges and risks that require special consideration. As the National
Commission noted, “[i]n the near term, the Alaskan frontier is likely to
attract the greatest attention, and to require the closest scrutiny, given the
potential energy resources and the physical and environmental challenges
of pursuing them safely.”313
This Part briefly describes the Arctic environment, the people and
wildlife that call it home, and the risks and challenges associated with
conducting OCS oil and gas operations in that environment. It also
advocates a suite of measures necessary to promote informed decisionmaking and safer operations in the Arctic.
A. Arctic Environment, People, and Wildlife
The Arctic OCS is a severe environment. Temperatures are below
freezing for most of the year, and winter temperatures at Prudhoe Bay on
311. See, e.g., MINERALS MGMT. SERV., REPORT TO CONGRESS: COMPREHENSIVE
INVENTORY OF U.S. OCS OIL AND NATURAL GAS RESOURCES, ENERGY POLICY ACT OF
2005—SECTION
357,
vii
(2006),
available
at
http://www.boemre.gov/revaldiv/PDFs/FinalInventoryReportDeliveredToCongresscorrected3-6-06.pdf (showing a cumulative production of oil from the Gulf of Mexico
OCS of 13.05 billion barrels of oil, while cumulative production from the rest of the OCS
combined was less than 1.1 billion barrels of oil).
312. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 301.
313. Id.

2011]

Shortcomings and Solutions

319

the Beaufort Sea have plunged below -60 ºF.314 Although the Beaufort
and Chukchi seas do not receive a great deal of precipitation, they are
subject to fog, rain, and snowstorms that can limit visibility.315 From
June to August, fog is common, and there are low visibility conditions on
the open sea 25-50 percent of the time.316 The Beaufort and Chukchi
seas are also subject to fierce storms, some of which can last for two
weeks at a time.317 Some storms have produced sustained winds of
seventy-five miles per hour and reported wind gusts close to 100 miles
per hour.318 Unlike other areas of the OCS, the Beaufort and Chukchi
seas are characterized by seasonal sea ice. Sea ice usually reaches its
maximum extent in March, and melts back to its minimum extent in
September.319 Sea ice is a dynamic environment; pack ice shifts and
moves with winds and currents and varies in time and place.320
The Arctic environment has been home to human communities for
thousands of years.321 Many Arctic residents depend on healthy marine
ecosystems to support their subsistence way of life.322 Some coastal
villages hunt limited numbers of bowhead whales in the Beaufort or
Chukchi seas, and the whale hunt is central to their culture.323 Arctic
peoples may also depend on fish, walruses, seals, and/or seabirds to
support their subsistence way of life.324 For many people who live in the
villages along the Beaufort and Chukchi coasts, continued health of
marine ecosystems is tied directly to the continued health of their food
supply and culture.325

314. MINERALS MGMT. SERV., 1 DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
BEAUFORT SEA AND CHUKCHI SEA P LANNING AREAS OIL AND GAS LEASE SALES 209, 212,
217, AND 221, 3-13 (2008), available at http://alaska.boemre.gov/ref/EIS%20EA/
ArcticMultiSale_209/2008_0055_deis/vol1.pdf.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 3-14.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 3-31.
320. Id.
321. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., SECRETARIAL REVIEW DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT/REGULATORY IMPACT REVIEW/INITIAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS
FOR THE ARCTIC FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN AND AMENDMENT 29 TO THE FISHERY
MANAGEMENT P LAN FOR BERING SEA/ALEUTIAN ISLANDS KING AND TANNER CRABS 202
(2009), available at http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/analyses/arctic/earirirfa0409_ secdraft.pdf.
322. Id. at 226–27.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 226.
325. Id.
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In addition to the humans who call the Arctic home, the Beaufort and
Chukchi seas support some of the world’s most iconic wildlife species.
These waters are home to an array of marine mammals including
bowhead, gray, and beluga whales; Pacific walrus; spotted, bearded,
ribbon, and ringed seals; and polar bears.326 The Arctic also hosts
migratory wildlife such as gray, humpback, minke, and killer whales, and
millions of seabirds, shorebirds, and waterfowl; these species come in the
summer to breed, feed, and rear their young.327 The Arctic supports a
number of important lower trophic level species, as well. Arctic cod, for
example, are a particularly important part of the Arctic marine food
web.328
B. Challenges to OCS Oil and Gas Activity in the Arctic
Environmental conditions present challenges for oil and gas
companies that seek to operate in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas.
Working conditions in the region are affected by “extreme cold,
extended seasons of darkness, hurricane-strength storms, and pervasive
fog.”329 In addition, “[t]he Chukchi and Beaufort Seas are covered by
varying forms of ice for eight to nine months a year,” which “limit[s]
exploratory drilling and many other activities to the summer months.”330
The physical conditions of the Arctic also pose challenges for oil
spill response operations. For example, “serious questions remain about
how to access spilled oil when the [sea] is iced over or in seasonal slushy
conditions.”331 Mechanical recovery equipment—such as vessels using
skimmers and boom—would likely operate at much lower efficiencies in
the icy waters of the Arctic than in more temperate waters.332 In-situ
burning may be difficult in slush or “grease” ice conditions, or in certain
concentrations of ice.333 “[T]he general consensus in the spill response

326. Id. at 162–175.
327. Id. at 142–50; 164–67.
328. See id. at 85 (noting that research indicates “that Arctic cod is a crucial link
between the sea ice food web and arctic marine mammals and birds”); see also id. at 201
(“Arctic cod is considered a keystone species in the Arctic ecosystem.”).
329. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 302.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. PEW ENVTL. GROUP, OIL SPILL PREVENTION AND RESPONSE IN THE U.S. ARCTIC
OCEAN: UNEXAMINED RISKS, UNACCEPTABLE CONSEQUENCES 75 (2010), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Protecting_ocean_
life/PEW-1010_ARCTIC_Report.pdf.
333. Id. at 79-80.
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community is that dispersants are not a proven technology for use in
most sea ice conditions.”334 Because oil will be slower to weather in cold
Arctic temperatures, it likely “would linger much longer in the marine
environment.”335
Lack of infrastructure to support a large spill response is another
factor in the Arctic. The eight main communities of Alaska’s North
Slope are not connected by road; there are relatively few docks and
airstrips; the nearest major port is in Dutch Harbor, Alaska, about 1,300
nautical miles from Point Barrow; and the nearest Coast Guard air station
is approximately 950 miles away in Kodiak, Alaska.336 The National
Commission noted that “industry and support infrastructures are least
developed, or absent” in the Arctic OCS.337
Another limitation on OCS oil and gas operations in the Arctic is a
lack of baseline scientific information necessary to make informed
planning and management decisions for the region. Such information is
especially critical because the Arctic’s physical and ecological systems
are in flux due to climate change.338
The National Commission
observed that “scientific research on the ecosystems of the Arctic is
difficult and expensive. Good information exists for only a few species,
and even for those, just for certain times of the year or in certain
areas.”339 It also determined that “detailed geological and environmental
information does not exist for the Arctic exploration areas” in the same
way that it does for the Gulf of Mexico or even the Atlantic.340 For
example, a recent BOEM analysis cataloged all the statements in an EIS
prepared for an oil and gas lease sale in the Chukchi Sea “that
acknowledged incomplete or unavailable information.”341 The catalog of
334. Id. at 82.
335. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 302.
336. PEW ENVTL. GROUP, supra note 332, at 22–23.
337. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 301; see also id. at 302 (noting that “oilspill response efforts are complicated year-round by the remote location” of the Arctic
OCS).
338. See NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NOAA’S ARCTIC VISION &
STRATEGY 1 (2010), available at http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/docs/ arctic_strat_2010.pdf.
(noting that “[t]here is now widespread and dramatic evidence of overall change in the
Arctic region,” including changes to the atmosphere, sea ice, and ocean); id. at 9
(identifying the need for “[i]mproved baseline observations and understanding of Arctic
climate and ecosystems” to “reduce[ ] uncertainty in assessing and predicting impacts”).
339. NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 303.
340. Id. at 301.
341. BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION, AND ENFORCEMENT, DRAFT
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, CHUKCHI SEA P LANNING AREA OIL
AND GAS LEASE SALE 193, App. A, 1 (2010) [hereinafter DRAFT SEIS LEASE SALE 193],
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missing information was 140 pages long.342 Recognizing the need for
additional scientific information about the Arctic OCS, Secretary Salazar
directed the U.S. Geological Survey to conduct “a special review of
information that is known” and to summarize “what knowledge gaps
may exist regarding environmental sensitivities, including impending
climate change, and other factors that would be considered in decisions
about potential future development” in the Arctic OCS.343
C. Additional Measures Needed to Safeguard Arctic Ecosystems
Although the Arctic OCS will benefit from the general OCS reforms
described in Part IV of this Article, additional measures are needed to
ensure that Arctic drilling—if it is allowed to proceed—is conducted
with “utmost care.”344
First, decision-makers must have access to more comprehensive
scientific information about the Beaufort and Chukchi seas. The U.S.
Geological Survey study noted above will be a good first step toward
identifying knowledge gaps. However, because of the limited nature of
the U.S. Geological Survey study, a more comprehensive scientific gap
analysis, performed by an independent entity outside DOI, may be
necessary.345 Beyond that, a long-term scientific research and monitoring
program is needed to begin the process of filling knowledge gaps. The
available at http://alaska.boemre.gov/ref/EIS%20EA/2010_034.pdf. BOEM undertook
this analysis because the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska determined that the
underlying EIS was unlawful because, among other things, the EIS failed to evaluate
properly whether missing information was essential to the decision-making process.
Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 730 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1019 (D. Alaska 2010).
342. See generally DRAFT SEIS LEASE SALE 193, supra note 341, App. A.
343. Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Sec’y Salazar Unveils Arctic Studies
Initiative that will Inform Oil and Gas Decisions for Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, paras. 34 (Apr. 13, 2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/2010_04_13_
releaseAcfm?renderforprint=1&.
344. See NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 302 (observing that conducting OCS
oil and gas operations in “offshore Arctic Alaska requires the utmost care, given the
special challenges and risks associated with this
frontier”).
345. For example, the conference report for the Department of the Interior,
Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010 noted the need for
“continuing comprehensive assessment of the health, biodiversity, and functioning of
Arctic marine and coastal ecosystems, including the impacts of industrial activities and of
climate change,” and called for a “scientific analysis conducted by an independent entity
to assess existing scientific information and identify any relevant additional information
to ensure adequate environmental review of proposed industrial activities in the region.”
H.R. REP. NO. 111-316, at 98–99 (2009) (Conf. Rep.).
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National Commission, for example, “recommend[ed] an immediate,
comprehensive federal research effort to provide a foundation of
scientific information on the Arctic.”346 According to the Commission,
such an effort should produce results
capable of informing decision-making related to oil and gas
leasing, exploration, and development and production in the
Arctic; measuring and monitoring impacts of oil and gas
development on Arctic ecological resources; natural resource
damage assessment should an oil spill occur[;] and protocols
in any treaty negotiated among the Arctic nations.347
Second, the federal government must develop oil spill response
measures that are specific to the Arctic environment. As noted above in
Parts IV(B)(3) and IV(D), government regulators should introduce
substantive, enforceable performance standards for oil spill response,
promote interagency review of oil spill response plans, and support the
development of better cleanup technologies. In doing so, regulators must
address the unique environmental conditions of the Arctic OCS.
Congress or BOEM should implement Arctic-specific spill-response
standards to ensure that spill response technologies will work effectively
in icy waters, and that there is adequate infrastructure and Coast Guard
presence in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas to support response efforts in
the event of a catastrophic spill. For example, the National Commission
recommended that before BOEM makes a determination that drilling in a
particular area of the Arctic is appropriate, (1) the agency should ensure
that industry containment and response plans are adequate; (2) the Coast
Guard and oil companies in the region should coordinate carefully and
build and deploy the necessary capabilities; and (3) Congress should
fund an expansion of Coast Guard capabilities in the Arctic.348
Third, management of activities on the Arctic OCS must be better
coordinated and must place a greater emphasis on protecting the health
of Arctic marine ecosystems. One of the National Ocean Council’s
(NOC) national priority objectives is addressing “environmental
stewardship needs in the Arctic Ocean and adjacent coastal areas in the
face of climate-induced and other environmental changes.”349 To help
attain this objective, the NOC is in the process of preparing a strategic
346.
347.
348.
349.

NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 303.
Id.
NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 304.
COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 307, at 6.
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action plan for the Arctic.350 In drafting the Arctic strategic action plan,
the NOC should prioritize protection of Arctic marine ecosystems and
emphasize science-based decision-making; it should take a precautionary
approach toward oil and gas activities in Arctic waters. As members of
the NOC,351 DOI, NOAA, the Coast Guard, EPA, and other federal
agencies should work together to ensure that the strategic action plan
addresses issues related to potential impacts of oil and gas activities in
the Arctic, including the potential for oil spills in the Beaufort and
Chukchi seas. When coastal and marine spatial planning efforts get
underway in the Arctic, these agencies should engage proactively.352
Fourth, BOEM should prepare updated, comprehensive NEPA
analyses and oil spill response plans for proposed oil and gas activities in
the Arctic. It is not appropriate to rely on NEPA analyses prepared prior
to the Deepwater Horizon disaster. As the CEQ observed:
[t]he BP Oil Spill constitutes significant new information and
circumstances that may require reevaluation of some conclusions
reached in prior NEPA reviews and other environmental
analyses and studies. Specifically, conclusions may change about
the likelihood, magnitude, and environmental impacts of a major
spill in connection with OCS oil and gas drilling activities.353
As a result, before deciding whether to authorize exploration drilling
in the Beaufort or Chukchi seas, BOEM must require potential OCS
operators to submit new exploration plans. To evaluate the potential
impacts of those exploration plans, BOEM should prepare
comprehensive EISs, based on the latest information, including
information revealed by investigations of the Deepwater Horizon
disaster, the U.S. Geological Survey’s review of Arctic science, and
other sources.

350. Id. at 39–40; see also National Ocean Council; Development of Strategic Action
Plans for the National Policy for the Stewardship of the Ocean, Our Coasts, and the Great
Lakes, 76 Fed. Reg. 4,139, 4,140 (Jan. 24, 2011) (calling for public comments on nine
strategic action plans, including a strategic action plan to address changing conditions in
the Arctic).
351. COUNCIL ON ENVTL QUALITY, supra note 307, at 20.
352. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 263 (“Integrating five-year
leasing plans and associated leasing decisions with the coastal and marine spatial
planning process will be an important step toward assuring the sustainable use of ocean
and coastal ecosystems. It could also reduce uncertainty for industry and provide greater
predictability for potential users of different areas.”).
353. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 125, at 32.
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Although implementing them will take some time, the foregoing
measures will help decision-makers make informed choices about
whether to allow oil and gas operations in the Beaufort or Chukchi seas.
If oil and gas activities do proceed, these measures will reduce the risk of
a catastrophic oil spill in vulnerable Arctic waters.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Deepwater Horizon blowout was a tragedy that took the lives of
eleven people and led to a marine oil spill of unprecedented size. The
disaster caused acute and ongoing injury to the people, wildlife, and
economy of the Gulf of Mexico, and rightly triggered a reassessment of
the nation’s oversight of OCS oil and gas activities. A series of
investigations and studies—some still in progress—researched what
went wrong and why it went wrong, and developed recommendations for
improvement. The 111th Congress developed comprehensive legislation
designed to address shortcomings in the laws that govern offshore oil and
gas activities, but in the end, failed to pass that legislation. DOI has
taken many steps to reform its internal structure and improve safety and
oversight, but as the National Commission observed, “[t]o assure human
safety and environmental protection, regulatory oversight of leasing,
energy exploration, and production require reforms even beyond those
significant reforms already initiated since the Deepwater Horizon
disaster.”354
Meaningful reform will require an OCS policy that prioritizes the
protection of ecosystem health; substantive, enforceable standards
designed to achieve that protection; improved coordination among
agencies; and better processes for evaluating potential environmental
risks and spill response capabilities. It will also require a willingness to
look beyond the oil and gas sector, and to implement practices that
facilitate integrated, coordinated, multi-sector planning and management
processes designed to help ensure protection, maintenance, and
restoration of ocean and coastal ecosystems.

354. GRAHAM & REILLY, supra note 1, at vii.

